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1. I 
One of the popular fallacies of post-war history has 
been that of giving to Woodrow Wilson the entire credit, 
or blame, for the creation of the League of Nations. It is 
thought that he conceived the idea, wrote the covenant 
which became a part of the treaty and then forced it upon 
the world. Only a few hours of reading in this field will 
convince one that although he wrote five drafts for the 
covenant, he acted more as an editor than as an author of 
the document that finally became a part of the Treaty of 
Versailles. However, many writers on the subject do agree 
that if it had not been for his untiring efforts to make 
the League a reality, it would never have become a part of 
the Treaty of Versailles. 
It is the purpose of this paper to show when and how 
Mr. Wilson came to the belief that a League of Nations 
should be one result of the peace negotiations, what he 
did to p~Jduce a document which would be acceptable to 
the powers at the peace conference and finally what he did 
to insure its incorporation into the Versailles Treaty. 
Woodrow Wilson as a student was primarily interested 
in American history and government. When a senior at 
Princeton in 1878 he wrote a critical paper on congress-
ional procedure that was published in the International 
Review. After an interlude during which he studied law at 
Virginia University and practiced it in Georgia he entered 
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Johns Hopkins University and continued his study of these 
subjects. His principal interest at this time was still 
the American government. Commenting on this attitude, 
which seems strange in the light of present-day concern 
over foreign affairs, Professor Henry B. Gardner (1), a 
fellow student, said that no one in those days had any 
particular interest in European problems. This point of 
view on the part of the educated group no doubt explains 
why nothing on the subject of our foreign relations can be 
found in Mr. Wilson's early writings. As a student of 
history he must have been aware of the schemes advanced 
for world peace by Grotius, Alexander I and others, but 
they could have made no impression upon him for there is 
nothing in what he said or wrote on the subject later to 
even remotely connect his own ideas with any of theirs. 
The first year of Wilson's administration as President 
of the United States was devoted to domestic reform. \v.hen 
the new president did turn his attention to foreign rela-
tions he adopted an advanced position. He promised the 
South and Central American countries that we would not 
meddle in their affairs in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Mexico was given to understand that we would not take ad-
vantage of a weak neighbor for our own profit. Wilson gave 
1. Professor Emeritus of Economics, 
Comment made during conversation 
Quoted with his permission. 
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11 of their government. These policies and measures were 
l1 labeled "Golden Rule Diplomacy" and were scoffed at by many 
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.,. of his political opponents. (1) There are those who believed 
. t\t-.a.t' fui~ reh,r\"'1"'1 in th~ r-e la.t-ions 
Jl (\.the United States and her South and Central American neigh-
!' bora presaged Wilson's later attempt to embody a like idea 
,, 
" 
in the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
In order to understand more clearly the background of 
Wilson's ideas for a League it is advisable to learn some-
thing of the societies and other organizations in the 
I; 
I 
!I 
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United States that had been working on methods for maintain- II 
ing permanent peace. These may be divided into three groups; il 
those formed before the United States joined as a belliger- !I 
ent, and those formed after April 17, 1917. The societies ,i 
I 
I 
I 
which made up the third group were interested chiefly in 
dispensing favorable propaganda for the League of Nations. 
Their activities are not important to this paper since they 
were carried on after the covenant had been written. 
The group of societies formed before the war gave aid 
and publicity to the attempts that were being made to 
settle international disputes by arbitration. The first of 
these societies, founded in 1910, was called the American 
Society for the Judicial Settlement of International 
Disputes. Its members were lawyers, publicists and eminent 
Dodd, w.E., Woodrow Wilson and his work, p.l35 
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citizens. ( 1) It had for its aim the e stablishmentc_co=f=a===---"'lr-
Court of Arbitral Justice at the Hague such as had been re-
commended by the Hague Conference of 1907. 
Another society in this group, the American Institute 
of International Law, was founded in Washington in 1912. 
It had for its object the propagation in America of the 
principles of justice which ought to prevail in the rela-
tiona between states. There were one hundred members or 
about five from each of the states of North and South 
America. 
The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 should also be 
mentioned as influences for peace. Peace Congresses were 
held from time to time in different parts of the world in 
order to acquaint the public with what was being done for 
peace and to arouse world-wide interest in the cause. 
National Peace Congresses held in some countries helped to 
spread the idea still more widely. 
The World Federation League, a short-lived orgnniza-
tion, was a product of such meetings. It prevailed upon 
Congress to pass a resolution which was approved by 
President Taft on June 25, 1910. The President was author-
ized to appoint a commission "to consider the expediency of 
1. Phelps, E.M., Selected Articles on a League of Nations, 
p.41. From an article by Charles H. Livermore, 
Secretary of the New York Peace Society in World Court 
3; 72-9, March 1917. 
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of utilizing existing international agencies for the purpose 
of limiting the armaments of the nations of the world by 
international agreement, and of constituting the combined 
force for the preservation of universal peace, and to consi-
der and report upon any other means to diminish the expen-
ditures of government for military purposes and to lessen 
the probabilities of war." (1) The President approved the 
resolution and, although it is believed to be the first 
attempt made by any legislative body to initiate an organ-
ization of the nations of the world with or without the 
element of force, it came to naught because no other nation 
was interested. The commission was never named. (2} 
After the outbreak of the war in Europe, but before 
the United States became involved, two other societies were 
formed. The first, the World Court League, was organized 
at a conference held in Cleveland, Ohio, on May 13, 14, and 
15, 1915. Its purpose was to concentrate popular attention 
in the United States on the necessity of establishing and 
maintaining an International Court of Justice. The League 
published a magazine, The World Court, to further this aim. 
In June of the same year; 1915, the League to Enforce 
Peace was organized at Independence Hall in Philadelphia. 
This society formulated a program for the reorganization of 
Phelps, E.M., Selected Articles on ~-Leagl.!e of Nations, 
p.33. 
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international affairs after the war. This plan provided 
for a world court, a council and a congress of nations. 
The success of this society was due in part to the 
readiness of the people of the United States to accept the 
new idea of internationalism, in part to the well-planned 
system for propaganda that the society employed and also to 
the fact that many influential people gave it their support. 
II In less than t w·o years this society received contributions 
1J amounting to $136,000. Mr. Millis calls the society "more 
elegant, more cultivated and more intellectual" than the 
group of pacifists whose program will be described later. 
To quote him further, "it fitted much more easily into the 
established scheme of things, and carried no such threats 
-----~--- ---
to the social and economic order as lurked obscurely within 11 
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the program of the evangelists. Ex-president Taft was to 
become one of its chief leaders; Mr. Elihu Root was to 
give it aid and comfort; Dr. Eliot of Harvard and Dr. 
Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia, Mr. Hamilton Holt and 
Mr. Theodore Marburg were among its distinguished liberal 
supporters, and it was to even find room strangely enough, 
for pacifists of a more martial character. For this was 
the movement which crystallized about the rather different 
and more militant idea {already current before the outbreak 
of the war) of establishing peace by setting up a world 
league which would be prepared to fight for it." (1) 
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Mr. Millis believed that many of the leaders of this so-
ciety used the organization to spread propaganda designed 
to bring the United States into the war on the side of the 
allies. It does not seem fair to indict the large mass of 
well meaning people in such a society with motives that 
may have actuated a few persons who used their connection 
with a peace organization to accomplish such ends. This 
society continued ita activities until after the peace had 
been arranged. 
The number of such societies in this country indicates 
the interest of many thinking people in the problem of 
settling international disputes by peaceful means even 
before the World ~ar. At that time it was thought that a 
body of international law to which all nations would sub-
scribe was the most plausible solution. After the war had 
begun it was evident that such a body of international law 
was ineffectual if states could disregard it for selfish 
reasons. The trend thereafter was to find some means of 
compelling nations to abide by the law. These later groups 
therefore advocated the use of force although the earlier 
ones had been unwilling to resort to that. 
Among the prominent persons in the United States who 
were of those advocating force in the cause of peace was 
Ex-president Theodore Roosevelt. He had been a very close 
follower of affairs during the Russo-Japanese war and was 
much interested in the peace that followed. He also had 
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something to say during the Algeciras crisis and in its 
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settlement. His experience in these affairs gave him the 
confidence to make the following prediction before the 
Nobel Prize Committee at Christiania, Norway in May 1910; 
"Finally it would be a master stroke if those great powers 
honestly bent on peace would form a League of Peace, not 
only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by 
force if necessary, its being broken by others. The 
supreme difficulty in connection with developing the peace 
work of The Hague arises from the lack of any executive 
power, of any police power to enforce the decrees of the 
court ••••••••• As things are now, such power to command 
peace throughout the world could best be assured by some 
conbination of those great nations which sincerely desire 
peace and have no thought themselves of committing agrees-
ions. The combination might at first be only to secure 
peace within certain definite limits and certain definite 
conditions; but the ruler or statesman who should bring 
about such a combination would have earned his place in 
history for all time and his title to the gratitude of all 
mankind." (1) 
In 1915, after the war had begun, Roosevelt reiterabed 
the same idea, "The one permanent move for obtaining peace 
1. Fleming, D.F., The United Sta~es and the League of 
Nations, Jt.5. 
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which has yet been suggested with any reasonable chance of 
obtaining its object is by an agreement among the great 
powers, in which each would pledge itself, not only to 
abide by the decisions of a common tribunal but to back 
with force the decision of that common tribunal. The 
great civilized nations of the world do possess force, 
actual or immediately potential, should combine by solemn 
agreement in the great World League for the Peace of 
Righteousness." (1) These quotations indicate Mr. 
Roosevelt's attitude toward peace but he was to forget all 
this in the excitement of the war and in the frustrations 
of his ambition to figure heroicly in action in France. 
William Howard Taft was another person of importance 
who had been working for peace since before the war. 
During his term as president the value of his work in the 
cause of peace was enhanced by the dignity of his high 
office. In December, 1910, he addressed the American 
Society for the Judicial Settlement of International 
Disputes. He said that if we would negotiate a treaty with 
some great nation to abide by adjudication of an inter-
national arbitral court in every issue we would have gone 
a long way in demonstrating that two nations could estab-
lish between themselves a system of due process of law 
1. Roosevelt, Theodore, America and the World War, p.ao. 
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similar to that which exists between individuals under a 
government. He felt that this was not inconsistent with 
those who believed that the element of force was necessary. 
The Ambassadors of England and France were both inter-
ested and treaties were drawn up following a pattern worked 
out by Mr. William Jennings Bryan. Their chief importance 
to history is that they distinguished in a formal manner 
between justiciable and non-justiciable disputes. They 
were placed before the Senate where they were amended to 
such an extent that their puspose as models was defeated. 
The President then refused to sign them. 
Mr. Taft did not seem discouraged by the failure of 
these treaties, but continued after he left the White House 
to talk about the possibility of settling disputes amicably. 
In an address at the Citizens Peace Banquet in New York on 
December 30 1 1911, he envisaged a League of Nations and 
said that his own treaties and even an international arbi-
tral court were only steps toward a larger goal. (1) In an 
address before the International Peace Forum in the same 
fl !, 
city on January 4, 1913, he expressed his belief that inter- 1 ~ 
locking treaties could be made the beginning of settling all 
international questions in a permanent, well-established 
court of arbijration whose powers would be enforced by 
Phelps, E.M., Selected Articles on a League of Nations, 
p.37. 
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as a complainant and bring any other nation as a defendant 
and could compel the defendant nation to answer the com-
plaint under the rule of law established for international 
purposes. He spoke many times later on the subject of !I II 
'I 
peace but what he said on those occasions will be considered Jl 
when actual sources of the Covenant are investigated. 
William Jennings Bryan, an avowed pacifist, was our 
Secretary of State from 1914 to 1916. He advocated real 
neutrality, and tried to retain a detached attitude toward 
the nations involved in the war. He resigned his office 
because he thought that the country was no longer neutral 
ha.cl 'o•V'! 
after the Second Lusitania note ~ sent to Germany. After 
his resignation he advocated peace from lecture platforms 
and from the pages of the Commoner, his own newspaper. At 
no time did he advocate a League of Nations. 
Other persons of importance who were pacifists and who 
believed that the way to establish peace was simply to end 
war were Jane Addams, Robert LaFollette, Lilian Wald, David 
Starr Jordan and Henry Ford. The movement that these 
persons represented was supported by pro-Germans and the 
Irish and therefore was not highly thought of by many who 
were already pro-Ally. 
Miss Addams organized the Women's Peace Party, Jan. 10, 
1915, dedicated to the immediate discussion of reasonable 
peace terms. In the spring of that 
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further plans for peace. They advocated Bettingup at once 
a group of representatives of all nations to atop the war 
by negotiations. Their program was too idealistic for the 
nations at war to consider seriously. 
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Wilson's first interest in European affairs came during I 
II 1914. Colonel E.M. House of Texas had been of great help 
to Wilson in the campaign for the presidency but refused to 
accept any public office. He came to be,not only a good 
'I 
I 
I 
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friend, but a trusted advisor. Colonel House had always been ,I 
I interested in politics and was also much interested in 
foreign affairs. It was in this field that he helped the 
President most. It is almost impossible to find an unbiased 
account of this period. Mr. Baker, Mr. Wilson's official 
biographer, is predjudiced for the President. Mr. Seymour 
who has edited the House Papers takes the other side, indi-
cating in his work that House initiated policies which 
Wilson carried through. Mr. Millis in his recent book 
The Road to War describes Mr. House as an innocently dis-
asterous advisor and shows that the President only acted 
wisely when he acted independently of House. Mr. Viereck 
in The Strangest Friendship in History indicates that he 
believes that all the good ideas originated with Mr. House, 
and that Mr. Wilson, because of his high regard for him, 
carried them out. To further complicate the problem the 
British diplomats are credited by Mr. Millis with superior 
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brains and strategy, the Germans and the Americans with 
great stupidity. Lord Grey he describes as a shrewd and 
clever diplomat--never to be outwitted. Mr. Viereck on the 
other hand accuses him of the very ordinary mistake of dilly-
dallying. 
Through the maze of the facts relating to the early 
~ 
work of~American administration it is difficult to find a 
definite policy. There may not have been one. The writer, 
however, in reviewing what appear to be the facts assumes 
that the American diplomats acted in good faith. These 
should have been men with no sympathies for any but the 
cause of the country that they represented. However, when 
one remembers the high feeling that developed in the United 
states during the war and the fate of those who tried to 
keep an unbiased point of view here, far removed from the 
conflict, it seems quite in keeping with human frailty that 
the diplomatic representatives abroad were sympathetic with 
the countries to which they had been assigned. 
In December 1913 Mr. House became ambitious to do 
something to bring about an understanding among France, 
Germany, England and the United States both military and 
naval. He talked the idea over with Sir William Tyrell, an 
Who \..ad- beel"\ 
English diplomat~sent to the United States to smooth out 
the Mexican situation. Sir William encouraged House and 
even suggested that he begin on Germany. The president 
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gave his casual consent to the proposition with the result 
that House sailed for Europe on May 16, 1914. The Germans , 
believing that Colonel House was a military man entertained 
him at a traditior.al military demonstration at Potsdam on 
tne.'!"e. 
June 1, 1914. House had a chance~to talk to the Kaiser who 
assured him that he intended to make no attempt to expand 
beyond the point needful to the def*nse of Germany. He 
declared himself the friend of England. House told him 
that it would not be difficult to harmonize the policies of 
England because British statesmen held the same view as he. 
He explained also that the United States was in a good po-
sition to act as go-between because they had no selfish 
interests. After a week in Paris during which House accom-
plished nothing he went back to London where he conferred 
with Walter Hines Page, our ambassador to the Court of st. 
James, and with Sir Edward Grey then Foreign Secretary. 
Grey was very sympathetic, but could promise nothing de-
finite without consulting France and Russia. After a very 
pleasant time in England, House sailed for home on July 21. 
This first mission of Mr. House in England, while not ini-
tiated by the President, had his approval and, because he 
was advised by House in his foreign pOlicy, it is important. 
He seems to have accomplished nothing more than to establish 
pleasant relations with English diplomats and with the 
Kaiser. 
The Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been murdered at 
II 
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Sarajevo before House sailed and after he reached home things 
happened quickly in Europe. On August 4 and 5 President 
Wilson sent telegraphic messages offering his good offices 
"in the interest of European peace, either now or at any 
other time." By the time this offer was received it was too 
late to do anything. 
Our press was pro-British very early due in part to 
early conclusions based upon accident and false information 
and in part to the fact that the news from Europe came 
through Great Britain. Only the Hearst papers frowned upon 
the allied cause. The death of the first Mrs. Wilson on 
August 6 removed the President from business long enough to 
delay his appeal to the people for real neutrality too long 
for it to be of real value. The press had already taken 
sides and an efficient British propaganda organization took 
over where our enterprising editors left off. It was to 
I 
prove a great advantage to Great Britain 
Anyone dissenting from the popular point 
as the war progresse~. 
of view was at first i 
thought stupid, later he was labeled pro-German and, after 
the United States entered the war, he was simply "yellow". 
Mr. House sailed for Europe a second time in the in-
terests of peace on January 30, 1915. House was to "put the 
reserves of the United States at the service of all the 
belligerants in whatever way the rules and practices of neu-
trality permit for the purpose of mitigating the distress 
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was to use no intermediaries. 
In the time which intervened between the first and 
second trips of Mr. House, business in the United States had 
greatly improved. Sales to the Allies had increased. 
Already the question of selling munitions had come before 
Congress. Mr. Hitchcock's bill forbidding this trade was 
lost. Great Britain was already dictating trade regulations. 
She was also using the American flag on her ships when tra-
velling through the war zone. (2) The protests of the State 
department to the British were to no avail. Mr. Wilson had 
stated his opinion on neutrality on January 8. "I, for one, 
would prefer that our thoughts should not too often cross 
the ocean, but should center themselves upon the policies 
and duties of the United States." (3) 
Mr. House had been in England a week visiting on the 
most friendly terms with his English friends. Sir Edward 
Grey with whom he discussed peace tried to discover defin-
ite terms to which the United States could agree and which 
would be acceptable to the Entente. Here House hedged and 
it wa8 while this was happening that Gerard wired the 
United States State Department February 11 that he thought 
II' 
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1. Viereck, G.S. The Strangest Friendship in History p. 78 I 
2. The Lusitania used this strategy at the time Mr. House 
was a passenger. 
3. Millis, w. Road to War. p.l27 
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sition for peace if it came immediately. The president re-
ferred him to Colonel House. At the same time Arthur 
Zimmerman, Foreign Minister for Germany, sent House an invi- I II 
I tation to come to Berlin intimating that peace could be dis- ~~ 
cussed. The Colonel consulted Grey who, in turn, consulted 
Asquith, Prime Minister at that time. Both advised House 
to put off his visit until Germany was not in such a strong 
military position. House wired the president these reasons 
for accepting the Zimmerman invitation. President Wilson's 
reply indicates that his point of view is more rational than 
that of House. "If an impression were to be created in 
Berlin that you were to come only when the British govern-
ment thought it an opportune time to come, you might be re-
garded when you reach there as their spokesman not mine." 
House replied to the president that the Germans were trying 
to use him and the time for doing anything slipped by. 
At home the problem of the British control of American 
shipping and the German submarine warfare occupied the State 
I ll 
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Department. On February 5 Germany had proclaimed a war zone. 1 
It was because of this that the Lusitania had misused the 
American flag. On February 10 the State Department sent a 
note to Germany declaring that if an American vessel should 
be destroyed on the high seas as a result of the assumption 
that it might be an enemy ship misusing the flag it would 
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be considered as an "indefensible violation of neutral 
rights." (1) There was added, too, a phrase which said 
that we would hold Germany "to strict accountability." At 
the same time the state department protested the illegal 
use of our flag by the British. 
On February 12, the British presented a reply to our 
note protesting their blockade which answered nothing and 
therefore little attention was paid to it. On March 1 the 
French and British presented notes prohibiting all further 
neutral trade to or from Germany. It was illegal, but was 
a reprisal against Germany's submarine warfare. 
The State Department of the United States suggested 
on February 20 that Great Britain allow foodstuffs from 
United States to enter Germany and to be distributed to 
civilians through an American agency. They asked Germany 
to abandon the use of the submarine against merchant 
vessels except after "visit and search". The British re-
fused and Germany would accept only on condition that raw 
materials be included with foodstuffs. This difficulty, 
however, sent House to Germany to work on peace including 
a new idea given him by Sir Edward Grey now that the 
British Blockade was in effective operation. The new idea 
was the inclusion in the permanent peace of the freedom of 
1. Millis, w., Road to War p.l36. 
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the seas to merchantmen in war time. 
Mr. House went to Berlin by way of Paris. There his 
overtures for peace were met with contrite demands for 
territorial conquests. In Berlin he found that they 
wanted peace as much as the British and advised him that 
the surest way to obtain it would be to embargo munitions 
exports. House thought this nonsense and talked freedom 
of the seas, but he began to realize that everyone wanted 
victory and he left badly disappointed. After Mr. House 
was safely back in England, the sinking of the Lusitania 
brought the question of submarine warfare into the papers. 
The newspapers in the United States clammered for war. 
Mr. House decided that it would of course bring the United 
States in on the side of the allies and planned to sail 
for home. When the German ambassador called on Mr. Bryan 
to express his regrets Mr. Bryan assured him that he would 
throw his influence for peace, but that since public opin-
ion was so inflamed Germany would need to make some motion 
of placation. President Wilson made his "too proud to 
fight" speech which satisfied the majority, but he really 
believed that if the United States were once embroiled in 
the war it would be impossible to think out a clear solu-
tion when the time came to make peace. 
The first Luaitania note was sent to Germany on May 13, 
1915. It had been discussed in cabinet meeting. It 
demanded a total surrender of Germany's position on 
-··---------·--·---- ------- ------· -
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submarine war~are under threat'o~ war. The German answer 
sent on May 29 played ~or time. A second note to Germany 
was dra~ted. Mr. Bryan re~used to sign it because he ~elt 
that it was too strong to sign. This placed Wilson in ~e 
embarrassing position of pressing a policy that was not a 
paci~ic one. The press helped the President by criticising 
Mr. Bryan as a tDaitor. The second Lusitania note did 
bring about a curb in submarine war~are on large liners. 
The orders, however, had been given secretly due to di~fi­
culties in the German government and the ~avorable publi-
city that this would have meant ~or Germany in the United 
States was lost. 
During the summer o~ 1915, large munition orders were 
received by manu~acturers in this country. -·Preparedness 
which had made headway through training camps became a pol-
itical issue and Wilson indicated that he would support it. 
A large loan had been raised for the Allies. Count 
Bernstor~f the German ambassador worked toward an under-
standing on the submarine question when the Arabic, a 
White Star Liner, was torpedoed and sunk without warning. 
Two American lives were lost and there was a great outcry 
from the press. Colonel House was ready to go to war, but 
the Germans then admitted openly the order that large 
passenger liners were not to be torpedoed without warning. 
Great Britain at the same time had unfortunately used the 
American flag on one o~ her "Q" boats. 
--· 
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One of the strangest diplomatic documents of this per-
iod was initiated by House. Millis calls it the "House-
Grey Memorandum", Viereck the "Gentleman's Agreement". On 
1: October 17, 1915, House wrote to Sir Edward Grey that he 
I! thought it would be a "world-calamity" if the war reached 
a point where the Allies, with the aid of the United States 
li could not bring about a peace such as the two of them had 
often discussed. He suggested that when the time was pro-
pitious he would consult the President and then come to 
England to confer with Grey. From there he would proceed 
to Germany, offer them a peace inferring that the Allies 
had rejected the proposal. Germany might accept, if not 
then it would be necessary for the United States to step 
in and help to force them to do so. 
Millis reports that Wilson was startled by this naive 
proposal in international adventure and double-dealing." (1) 
Viereck says that the president was "electrified." (2) He 
approved the letter, but made what both of them considered 
at the time an unimportant verbal change, he inserted the 
word "probably" in the sentence "It would be necessary for 
us to join the Allies." Millis offers an excellent analy-
sis of the two ways in which this remarkable letter could 
be interpreted. 
1. 
2. 
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"Patently, the House scheme might work in either of two 
ways. It might bring a peace through forcing a conference, 
which would then necessarily be dominated by the more or 
less 'disinterested' influence of the United States into the 
war to help the Allies conquer one. President Wilson, it 
seems clear, thought of the scheme as directed primarily 
toward the former result. The possibility of an American 
participation in the war would be used merely as a lever 
with which to force the conference; naturally, this in-
volved some risk of an actual participation, but the 
President must have regarded that as a remote and problem-
atical contingency. Colonel House, on the other hand, had 
little real confidence in the conference idea. He appears 
to have regarded the scheme as primarily a means of putting 
the American people definitely upon the Allied battle line. 
The President, it is reasonable to suppose, inserted his 
'probably' assuming that this was what House had really 
meant; House accepted the correction assuming that it w~s 
but a verbal safeguard which the President did not mean. 
Subsequent history leads one to the inference that both 
men were mistaken." (1) 
Grey received at the same time a vigorous protest 
from Mr. Lansing with regard to the blockade. Three weeks 
1. Millis, W., Road to W~, p.231, 
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taken in conjunction with his proposal, made some weeks 
earlier, for a league of nations. Wilson authorized House 
to reply in the affirmative. (1) 
No wonder that Grey was bewildered. He waited until 
the end of November and wrote a lukewarm reply with which 
House was disappointed. Grey wrote that he was so certain 
that the Allies would reject the scheme that he had not 
I 
even mentioned it to them. They could not commit themselves ;I 
! 
without knowing that the "United States was prepared to 
intervene and make good if they accepted." (2} The word 
"probably" had had a deadly effect. The allies could not 
have agreed to anything but a definite guarantee by the 
United States to fight Germany in order to have agreed to 
a peace conference at this time. Perhaps Grey knew that 
his attitude of indifference would encourage a more defin-
ite offer. 
Colonel House and the President discussed Grey's reply. 
Wilson felt that they should let the Allies know what they 
were thinking. It was decided that the Colonel's visit 
should be represented as a personal survey to enlighten 
the Administration with regard to events in Europe. The 
1. 
2. 
Viereck, G.s., Strangest Friendship in Historl, p.llO. 
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State Department announced that it was not a "peace mission." 
At this inopportune time what did the Germans do but request 
Colonel House to go directly to Berlin to discuss peace. I! 
He was not to be misled, however. He suspected the Germans I 
of trying to put the United States in an unfavorable position! 
with the Allies. He sailed for England December 28. He 
was to work for the future peace of the world and its main-
tenance, military and naval disarmament and a league of 
+o 
nations to suppress aggression and~maintain the freedom of 
the seas. (1) 
Colonel House arrived in Falmouth, England on Jan. 5, 
1916. He went to London and immediately began conversations 
with the British statesmen. He intended first to explain 
America's co8peration in a world organization for bringing 
about world peace. He intended to stress general disarma-
ment and freedom of the seas. Colonel House believed that 
the United States would be drawn into the war, he wanted 
it to be on the side of the Allies and he wanted it to be 
on a clear cut issue which would enable this country to 
stand for high principles at the peace conference. 
During the two weeks that House spent in England he 
renewed personal contacts which enabled him to explain the 
position of this country. The really important conferences 
1. Millis, W., Road to War , p. 250. 
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1, of this period were with Lloyd George, Grey and Balfour ,, 
il 
,, with regard to the end of the war and the role of coBpera-
'I I tion which the United States might play if Great Britain 
!I agreed to intervention. 
On January 20, House left for Germany by way of Paris 
and Geneva. In Berlin, he talked first with Gerard, with 
the German foreign minister, the chancellor and others. He 
soon discovered that the rulers of Germany were in no mood 
to talk of peace terms to which the Allies would agree. He 
felt that all he could do in this case was to ask them to 
restrain their methods of warfare so as to make a sincere 
reconciliation ~ossible •. 
In Geneva, House conferred with our Ambassador to 
Austria-Hungary. (1) Page (2) sent him news from Rome. 
Both of these diplomats felt that the war was approaching a 
stalemate and that the time was ripe for the House 
proposition. 
In Paris House talked with Briand, the Premier, Jules j1 
Cambon, who was directing the French Foreign office and with I 
many others. These apparently trivinl interviews were really 1 
important because popular opinion in France was against the !1 
President of the United States and House hoped by this means 
to promote more friendly feeling. He told the French that 
1. Penfield 
2. Thomas Nelson Page 
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if they had some decisive victories during the summer the 
United States would not intervene but in case of reverses 
or a deadlock, the United States would intervene. Only 
Wilson, House and Lansing knew of this agreement. 
After a brief interview with the King of Belgium, 
Colonel House returned to London on February 9, and there 
he again talked with government heads, Geo~ge, Reading, 
Asquith, Grey, and Balfour with regard to the proposals 
under which the United States would come into the war. 
Thus we see that even before the war there was an 
effort on the part of certain persons in the United States 
to find some way of making the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes possible. A court had been set up 
at the Hague, (1) cases had been brought before it, they had 
been heard and the court's decisions had been accepted by 
those nations involved in each dispute. The Peace Congresses! 
served to increase the power of the court since they gave 
it the popular sanction that such a court requires. With 
the outbreak of the war it was evident that there must be 
some means of compelling nations to bring their disputes 
before the court. Roosevelt had recognized this in the 
beginning but the emergency of the war brought the realiza-
tion to the masses. Those in power hoped that the United 
States might bring the warring parties together and help 
1. This court was the result of the Hague Conference of 
1907. 
II 
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i) [, them find a solution to their difficulties. As the war pro-
,1 
'J gressed this hope did not materialize. Instead the United 
II 
!I 
I 
States was being inevitably drawn into the conflict. It was 
then that the advocates of a League for peace realized that 
such an association might be made one of the main issues 
of the peace settlement. 
President Wilson first revealed the trend of his 
thought with regard to the basis upon which a permanent 
peace could be maintained in an address before the American 
Bar Association on October 20, 1914. He said then that 
peace could be rebuilt only upon the ancient and accepted 
principles of international law, only upon those things 
which remind nations of their duties to mankind and to 
humanity. (1) At about the same time, the fall of 1914, the 
President said in a conversation with Dr. Stockton Axon, 
"After the war all nations must be absorbed into some great 
association of nations whereby all shall guarantee the in-
tegrity of each so that any one nation violating the agree-
ment between all of them shall bring punishment on itself 
automatically." (2) Although the President made this remark 
in private to a person who was really a member of his family 
he made no public mention of his convistion until the cam-
paign of 1916. In Des Moines, IOwa, on February 1 of that 
1. Baker, R.S., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson. The 
New Democracy, vol.I, p.379. I 
Fleming, D.F., The United States and the Lea ue of ,
1 
2. 
Nations, p. 7, quote rom T e New T mes o Feb. 4. / 
1924. . i 
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year he said, "I pray God that if this contest had no other 
result, it will at least have the result of creating an 
international tribune and producing some sort of joint guar-
antee of peace on the part of the great nations of the world." 
(1) 
Colonal House says that the President first definitely 
and publicly committed himself to the idea of a League of 
Nations when he spoke before the League to Enforce Peace 
on May 27, 1916. House was much interested in this parti-
cular address and did much to advise the President as to its 
contents. House had corresponded with Sir Edward Grey with 
regard to his ideas for a League that would be acceptable 
to the English people. The speech was drafted with all this 
in mind. (2} It sounded the keynote for American diplomatic 
policy for the next four years. With it Wilson gave up the 
policy of isolation and cast his lot with that of Europe. 
His exact words were, "The principle of public right must 
henceforth take precedence over the individual interest of 
particular nations, and that the nations of the whole bind 
themselves together to see that right prevails as against 
any sort of selfish agression; that henceforth alliance 
must not be set up against al~iance, understanding against 
---------------
1. Fleming, D.F., The United States and the League of 
Nations, p.7, quoted from TneNew-YOrk Times-or-
February 4, 1924. 
2. Seymour, c., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House 
vol. IV, p.3. 
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understanding, but there must be a common agreement for a 
common object and the common object must be the invincible 
rights of peoples and mankind." (1) This speech not only 
informed the United States that the President would stand 
for a League of Nations, but it also should have been a 
definite clue to Europe. Both England and France, however, 
were too preoccupied to notice much more than an unfortunate 
phrase that Wilson used -- that the United States was not 
concerned with the causes or motives of the war. From.this 
time on the President did not make an important public 
address without mentioning an association of nations. (2) 
The one most widely known is the declaration of the famous 
fourteen points which he set forth in a speech before the 
joint session of Congress, January 8, 1918. These were, 
he believed, all necessary to a lasting peace and were ul-
timately accepted as the basis of the final peace settlement. 
( 3) 
Over two years elapsed between Mr. Wilson's first 
pronouncement for a League of Nations and the first draft 
that he wrote of its constitution. During 1917 he was too 
much occupied with the war to devote any time to work on 
1. Baker, R.S., The Public Pa_pors of Woodrow Wilson. The 
New Democrac~, vol. !, p.l~5. 
2. Seymour, c., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 
vol. IV, P.3. ---
3. Encyclopedia Brittanica, vol. XXIII, p.635. 
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definite plans. He did, however, ask Colonel House to 
collect and analyze the opinions of interested persons at 
home and abroad. Sir William Wiseman, a trusted frientf of 
House, collected such information for him in England and 
on the Continent. During the months of January and 
February of 1918 the Colonel consulted with William Howard 
Taft, Elihu Root and Nicholas Murray Butler. He wrote to 
President Lowell of Harvard in an attempt to find out how 
the ideas of the different groups in America might be 
brought together. (1) Vfuen House approached the President 
with regard to a definite program he replied that such a 
plan could not be made out of whole cloth, but that it 
would have to be allowed to grow. (2) 
While sentiment for peace was developing in the United 
States, all of the important countries of Europe, especially 
those involved in the war, were fostering peace movements 
of various kinds. Those in England are noted here because 
the results of developments there were used later in 
drafting the final constitution of the League. A League 
of Nations Society was flourishing there. A League had been 
included as one of the war aims recognized by the Inter-
allied Labour and Socialistic Conference of Frebunry 1918. 
-----------·---·--------
1. Seymour, C., The Tntimate Papers of Colonel House, 
vol. IV, p.4. 
2. Ibid, vol. IV, p.l6. 
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In March the first official constitution for a League to be 
drawn up under government direction was presented to Lord 
Balfour, then Foreign Secretary, by the Committee on the 
League of Nations of which the Right Honorable Sir Walter 
G.F. Phillimore was chairman. The other members of the 
commission were English barristers. The Report of this 
commission is commonly called the Phillimore Report by those 
writing on the League of Nations. {1) President Wilson 
received a copy of this report as did all heads of govern-
ments of countries interested in the peace. The Phillimore 
Report provided for arbitration of disputes between nations, 
for treatment of a nation that refused to arbitrate and for 
a basis of relationships between members and non-members of 
such a group of nations. 
House reports that Woodrow Wilson considered this 
proposal "insufficient in many respects", (2) turned it over 
to him and asked him to draw up a new draft of a "covenant". 
Of! the origin of the use of the word "covenant" to designate 
the constitution of the League Ray Stannard B&ker says that 
it was Wilson's own name for the document but House 
1. 
2. 
Members of the committee submitting 
Walter G.F. Phillimore, chairman 
A.F. Pollard 
Julian Corbett 
J. Holland Rose 
Eyre A. Crowe 
w. Tyrell 
C.J.B. Hunt 
A.R. Kennedy, secretary 
Report •I the Phillimore . 
Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement,vol.I, 
p. 218. - -- - -
Colonel House set about writing the draft desired by 
the President, trying to embody not only Mr. Wilson's ideas 
and his own, but also those of the many persons who were 
interested in the League of Nations idea becoming a reality. 
He· says that he did not use the Phillimore Report when he 
wrote his draft because he did not wish to become entangled 
with their plan. When he had written out his own ideas he 
then incorporated several of their articles as a whole. 
David Hunter Miller was consulted by House while the draft 
was being v~itten but Miller saw nothing of the draft nor 
is there any record of the suggestions that he might have 
made. (2) 
The House Draft consisted of twenty-three articles. 
It contained a more detailed plan for organization than the 
Phillimore Report. It provided for a permanent secretariat 
and included a world court that House had previously opposed. I 
In making provision for punishing a state that had violated 
the agreements the use of force was mentioned, but blockade 
was made the final recourse. It contained provisions for 
reduction of armaments, nationalization of the manufacture 
of war materials, full publicity in military affairs, 
1. Seymour, C., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol,IV. 
p.22~ 
2. Ibid., vol. IV, p.24. 
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abandonment of espoinage and, most important of all, a 
direct guarantee of territorial integrity and political in-
dependence of members of the League. (1) 
President Wilson received this draft and a letter of 
explanation from Colonel House on July 16, 1918. He imme-
diately set to work to recast it to suit his own ideas. He 
rearranged the subject matter into thirteen articles instead 
of the original twenty-three. There seems to have been no 
reason for his having done so except that he often used the 
number thirteen and that it had applied to so many facts 
of his life. (2) 
Wilson wrote his own preamble. It is a good paragraph 
for connecting the work of the peace organizations of the 
time with the new ideas of diplomacy. It was changed only 
slightly in wording in his succeeding drafts. (3) 
Article I of Wilson's First Draft provided for dele-
gates to meetings of the League and for a presiding officer 
of the assembly of delegates. It suggested a temporary 
place of meeting. This was with some changes of wording, 
the same as Article 5 of the Phillimore Report and came to 
the President by way of Article 6 of the House Draft. 
House and Wilson described the delegates more definitely in 
that they specified "ambassadors and ministers" and 
1. Baker, R.S., Woodrov; 'Nilson and World Settlement, voll, 
p.219. 
2. Ibid, vol.I, p.223. 
3. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.l3. 
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"foreign minister" where the Phillimore Report used 
"diplomatic representatives". The latter report provided 
that the president or sovereign of the country where the 
conference convened should be president of the meeting. 
Neither House nor Wilson mentioned this. 
Article II provided that the Body of Delegates should 
regulate their O\vn procedure and should appoint committees 
for investigation of anything lying within their field of 
action. It provided that a majority vote should decide any 
action covered by the article. This also came from the 
Phillimore Report through Colonel House, who added a pro-
vision for a permanent secretariat to act as a ministerial 
agancy, the expense of operation to be borne by the con-
tracting powers. Wilson included the House addition and 
changed the last phrase to read "expense of the maintenance 
of the Secretariat shall be borne as they prescribe." 
Article III of the President's Draft became the famous 
Argicle X of the final draft of the Covenant. It provided 
of 
for a direct guarantee ~ political independence and terri-
I ~ 
I 
torial integrity and that any future changes would be made II 
only if in accordance with the principle of self-determinatio~ 
and with the consent of three-fourths of the delegates. I 
House wrote this as Article 20 of his draft. He included it I 
because he knew that Wilson felt very strongly on the matter. II 
He added qualifying phrases to keep it from being too ! 
' . 
I 
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inflexible when it would be put into use. (1) 
Article IV contained the paragraph which referred to 
reduction of armaments, to the manufacture of munitions, 
implements of war, and to the publicity of armament and 
naval programs. This was House's Article 21. Wilson made 
some changes in wording and one in meaning. \Vhere House 
recommended reduction of armaments to "the lowest point con-
sistent with domestic safety", Wilson added "and the enforce-
ment by common action of international obligations". House 
was not in favor of using force to carry out the League's 
wishes or demands. 
Article V outlined a definite method ~or choosing 
arbitrators in case of disputes which could be settled 
through the usual diplomatic channels. It also indicated 
what shoumd be done when arbitrators could not make a 
decision. This article was taken directly from House with 
some expansion for the sake of clarity. 
Article VI provided that any state refusing to submit 
a dispute to arbitration or to abide by decisions rendered 
"shall thereupon lose and be deprived of all rights of com-
merce and intercourse with any of the contracting powers.'' 
The House Draft, Article 14, specified the international 
court as the body which would render the decision. 
1. Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol.I, 
p.222. 
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Article VII of the President's draft was Article 2 of 
the Phillimore Report which said in such a case (that of any 
power beginning hostilities or declaring war before sub-
mitting the dispute to arbitration) the member powers "will 
come to the assistance of" the power being attacked. House 
planned to use "blockade and closing frontiers to conrrnerce 
or intercourse with the world" against the offending state. 
Wilson followed the spirit of the Phillimore Report, used 
the wording of House, but intended to "use any force that 
may be necessary" to assist the offended state. 
Article VIII was made up of Articles 5, 7 and 8 of the 
House Draft. It declared that any war or threat of war 
whether or not it affacted member nations was of concern to 
the League, and that the League would meet "in the interests 
of peace whenever it was advisable or at such other times 
and upon such other occasions as they may from time to time 
determine." Wilson added to these provisions the right of 
the powers to take any action that they deemed advisable to 
safeguard the peace of nations. The Phillimore Report had 
made no provisions for the League in peace times. 
Article IX of Wilson's First Draft was Article 13 in the 
Phillimore Report and Article 16 in the House Draft. It 
provided for the prodedure necessary to settle a dispute 
between a member power and one not a member. Wilson ex-
panded this in order to clarify its meaning but added no 
new idea. 
I 
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Article X included the provision for blockade against 
a power beginning hostilities before a decision had been 
rendered by the delegates, but where the Phillimore Report 
and the House Draft said "may" come to the assistance of 
the power being attacked, the Wilson Draft read, "The Con-
tracting Powers shall also unite in coming to the assistance 
of the Contracting Power against which hostile action has 
been taken, combining their armed forces in its behalf." 
Much more will be said of this article later. 
Article XI directed members of the League as to action 
when the dispute in question was between non-members of the 
League. Wilson followed the other two plans in this, 
Article 16 of the Phillimore Report and Article 19 of the 
House Draft. Under such conditions the disputing powers 
might offer to submit their differences to the League. If 
they did so they would be treated as members, if not, the 
delegates would consider the matter and make recommende..tions 
as to ways to keep the peace. 
Article XII provided for states not signatory members 
to become so later. House took his Article 22 verbatim 
from the Phillimore Report, Article 17. Wilson changed the 
wording somewhat because both of the other plans seemed to 
point to Germany. 
Article XIII came directly from the other drafts with 
very little rearranging. It provided that the new treaty 
should take precedence over former treaties and that future 
I 
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treaties could not be made which would be inconsistent with 
the Covemant. (1) 
President 'Wilson had finished his first draft of the 
Covenant by August 15, 1918 for on that date he was in 
Magnolia, Massachusetts, to discuss it with House. (2) He 
made no changes as a result of this consultation until after 
he had arrived in Paris for the Peace Conference. (3) 
Wilson has been accused of going to Paris without any 
definite plan for a League of Nations. This report grew out 
of the fact that he had refused to have his draft published. 
There appear to be several reasons for his refusal. He had 
asked the British to withhold the Phillimore Report and felt 
that it would be discourteous to them to publish his before 
they had had an opportunity to publish theirs. It would 
have given Senator Lodge and his group of "Irreaoncilables" 
definite material from which to build an opposition. Inter-
esting information with regard to the activities of this 
group is to be found in the reminiscences of Alice Roosevelt 
Longworth. She says that after the election "the source of 
continuous excitement was Mr. Wilson's trip to Paris to the 
Peace Conference. We talked of very little else. We were 
well aware that the President was going to Paris with the 
major purpose of bringing back with him a League of Nations, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Phillimore Report, Article 18, A. and B. and House Draft, 
1
1 
Article 23, A. and B. 
Seymour, c., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol.IV, 
p. 48. !I 
Baker,R.S.,Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement,vol.I,p.22~. 
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a league which would pledge us in advance regardless of our 
interests, to use our armed and economic forces when ques-
tions arose which were of no possible concern to us. It was 
difficult if not impossible, to find out what was really 
going on. The plans of the conference v1ere kept entirely 
in the hands of Mr. Wilson and his chosen advisors." (1) 
This attitude on the part of his political opponents might 
well make the President cautious. 
Wilson's reticence with regard to his plan for a 
League may have been due in part to still another factor, a 
theory to be found in his own political philosophy. In his 
book, Constitutional Government in the United States, ~ 
he described the leadership of the President. In the 
chapter entitled, "The President of the United States", he 
v~rote, "He cannot escape being the leader of his party 
except by incapability and lack of force, because he is at 
once the choice of the party and the nation. The nation as 
a whole has chosen him and is conscious that it has no other 
political spokesman •••••••• Let him once win the admiration 
and confidence of the country, and no other single force can 
withstand him, no combination of forces will easily over-
power him. He is the representative of no constituency, but 
of the whole people. When he speaks in his true character, 
he speaks for no special interest. If he rightly interpret 
1. Longworth, A.R., Crowded Hours, p.276. 
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the national thought and boldly insist upon it, he is irre-
sistible •••••••• A president whom it (the country) trusts can 
not only lead it, but form it to his own views." (1) 
Wilson's silence concerning his plans for the League 
before the peace conference convened and his independence of 
action afterward correspond too accurately to this descrip-
tion of the President to have been coincidence. His defeat 
at the polls in November indicated xo his enemies the defeat 
of his policy. To the President it m~ant only that his 
party no longer had control of Congress. He was still the 
president and therefore the spokesman of the people and the 
leader of foreign affairs. 
Wilson arrived in Brest on December 13, 1918, and on 
the following day he was in Paris. Much of his time on 
those first days was spent at formal receptions, luncheons 
and entertainments. He had hoped that the Conference would 
begin its work soon after his arrival and was impatient with 
the delay. Lloyd George,however, refused to appoint persons 
to represent England until after elections there. Clemenceau 
wanted to sound out Parliament as to its sentiment before he 
formulated his policies. In the meantime Wilson visited 
England and Italy. The common people everywhere received 
him with acclaim. They had great faith in him and in his 
1. Wilson, W.W., Constitutional Governmnnt in the United 
~tate.s., pp.77- • 
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ideals. The politicians of Europe began to realize how great 
his power was to be. There was much critisism of the 
President for his intention to represent the United States 
personally at the Peace Conference. Even his friends felt 
Before Mr. Wilson wrote his Second Draft for the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, he had seen A Practical 
Suggestion, written by General Jan Christian Smuts, and a 
draft for a league prepared by Lord Robert Cecil. Both of 
these were based upon the Phillimore Report. (1) Mr. Smuts' 
Plan made a favorable impression on the President as his own 
Second Draft indicates. They were the only two drafts 
which influenced Wilson in the rewriting .of his First Draft, 
although he also had the suggestions of Mr. Lansing at hand. 
(2) His Second Draft is called by some writers his "First 
Paris Draft", but this is confusing since it has led readers, 
some of them otherwise well-informed, to think that it was 
the President's First Draft of the Covenant. Therefore in 
this paper the drafts written by Wilson will be numbered 
1. Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settle·ment, vol.I, 
p.224. 
2. Ibid., p.228. Baker says here that Lansing's papers I 
appear to have been filed by the President without hnvingil. 
been used. 
. . I 
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chronologically with no qualifying word indicating where 
they were written. In noting changes made in the revision 
only enough of the preceding draft will be recalled to make 
the meaning clear. Vfuen no mention is made of an article it 
must be assumed that no change worth noting was made. 
In the Second Draft three words were changed in the 
Preamble. This did not alter the meaning. 
The first part of Article I remained as before. It 
indicated who would represent the nations in the League, who 
should preside, and where temporary meetings might be held. 
The addition of a paragraph giving the powers the right to 
assist its representative by "any conference, counsel or 
advice that may seem best to it and to substitute a special 
representative for its regular representative accredited to 
H", may have come .from the Phillimore Report, Article V, 
paragraph 2, which said that the Allied States had the right 
to 11 send other representatives than those regularly provided", 
but that "the Conference shall be under no obligation to 
await their arrival". It could also have been Wilson's idea. 
Article II in the Second Draft was greatly expanded from 
General Smuts' A Practical Suggestion. From it Wilson 
borrowed the idea o.f a permanent Council to act as an 
executive committee of the League. Members of the Council 
were to be representatives of the greut powers with others 
drawn in annual rotation from two panels, namely a group o.f 
near-great powers and one of minor states. Three negative 
votes in the Council would act as a veto. (1) A new para-
graph, also from Smuts, enlarged upon the duties of the 
43. 
~ secret~riat. (2) 
I! 
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To Article IV, which provided for the reduction of arma-
ments, manufacture of~u~itions, publicity of national arma-
ments, military and naval programs, were added two new para-
graphs. The most important of these abolished conscription 
and all other forms of compulsory military service. Forces 
for defense were to consist of militia of volunteers, numbers 
and methods of training to be fixed after expert inquiry by 
agreements with regard to armaments. The second additional 
paragraph provided for methods of deciding the amount of 
armaments allowed to each power. These two paragraphs came 
from Articles 15 and 16 of the Smuts Plan. (3) 
Article V of Wilson's Second Braft contained additions 
from Articles 18 and 21 of General Smuts' Plan. Since he had 
taken over the idea of a council, he had also to nake over 
the provision which conformed to the new idea, that of sub-
mitting matters for dispute to inquiry by the Council. The 
decision of the Council was not to be a binding verdict. 
This was new, as Wilson had previously advocated compulsory 
arbitration. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.II, p.45, 
Articles 10 to 13. 
Ibid., vol.II, p.45, Article 13. 
Ibid., vol.II, p.72. 
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Article VI was practically the same as Article 19 or 
Smuts' Plan, which was substantially Article 2 of the 
Phillimore Plan. In Wilson's First Draft he had provided for 
boycott against any pov1er refusing to arbitrate a dispute. 
In the Second nraft he took over the idea of an ipso racto 
war with covenant-breaking states. The penalty for the law-
breaking state, perpetual disarmament was a new provision 
from the Smuts Plan. 
The only new material in Article VIII was a paragraph 
which was a rewording or Article 16 of the Phillimore Report. 
It referred to the right of any delegate of the League to 
call the attention of that body to circumstances anywhere 
which threatened war. House gives Wilson credit for this 
article because of a statement that he made when talking to 
a group on board the "George Washington". He said then that 
he hoped that the ruture international community would permit 
any nation to "butt in" when trouble threatened. (1) 
There were two additions to Article XII which dealt with 
powers that were to join the League later. These were 
limited to those "whose government is based upon the principle 
of popular self-government". The admission of powers so 
qualified was to depend upon the affirmative votes of two-
thirds of the delegates. 
1. Seymour, C., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 
vol. IV, p. 26 • 
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It is interesting to notice that again Woodrow Wilson 
kept the number of his articles to thirteen in his Second 
Draft and put the additional material into supplementary 
agreements. In the first of these agreements he followed his 
own fifth point in his program of fourteen points. Smuts, 
to whom he is indebted for the plan of the mandates, did not 
include the German Colonies in his plan for mandatories but 
Wilson did. In the first agreement he definitely gives such 
territory into the trusteeship of the League. (1) 
Agreement II was taken almost word for wor~ from Articles 
4 and 5 of the Smuts' Plan. It stated that any authority, 
control or administration necessary for the peoples of a 
mandate should be vested in the Leegue and that it might 
designate or appoint an agent wherever possible. 
Agreement III is the same as Articles 6, 7, and 8 of 
Smuts' Plan. Each mandate was to be governed by a special 
act with the League reserving complete power of supervision 
and with the people of the territory having the right of 
appeal to the League. The policy of the open door was to be 
maintained for all members of the League. Military and 
naval forces of the territory would comform to definite 
standards of the League. The third paragraph of this agree-
mant provided substitution of one mandate for another, an 
idea of the President. 
1. Article 3 of Smuts' Plan expanded. 
i 
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Agreement IV followed Articles 8 and 9 of Smuts' Plan. 
Wilson here named Austria-Hungary and Turkey as empires from 
which new states would evolve. They might be admitted to 
membership in the League if they conformed to armaments 
requirements. The League reserved the right to watch over 
relations inter se of all new independent states created 
out of empires with a view to maintaining peace. 
Agreement V was a paragraph with regard to humane 
working conditions for labor and the establishment and 
maintenance of fair hours. Wilson added this because of the 
increasing interest of Labor in world affairs. (1) He 
realized that this provision w~s irrelevant to the other 
matters to be discussed, but hoped nevertheless to "do some-
thing about it." (2) 
Agreement VI was a paragraph guaranteeing equality of 
treatment for racial or national minorities within the new 
states. This addition was probably due in some measure to 
propaganda by the Jews. 
It will be seen from the foregoing detailed account of 
changes in the President's First Draft that he had devel-
oped a much clearer idea of what he wanted the League to be. 
He had dropped compulsory arbitration, adopted the council 
idea and the plan for mandates for backward territories, 
1. 
2. 
Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol.I, 
p. 227. -
Seymour, c., The Intimate Papers of Colonel Hous~, 
vol.IV, p.284. I 
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taken over the sanction of an ipso f~ war and added a 
clause concerning labor and one for the welfare of racial and 
religious minorities. 
Changes in wording no doubt account for the impression 
that the new draft was more clear and more definite than the 
first. Wilson had had time to think matters over, to talk 
of his plans with House, and to study the Phillimore Report 
and General Smut's Practical Suggestion before he \~ote his 
Second Draft. 
The Council idea was not a new one. It was old enough 
to have a name, "diplomacy '6y conference". It was a much 
more flexible method for conducting business than \·ras poss-
ible in a large assembly. The President had discussed with 
House the possibility of a council as a solution to the 
problem of having the great powers in a perpetual minority in 
the League. David Hunter Miller bad thought of a council 
and had suggested the idea to House November 30, 1918, but 
Wilson did not ask Miller for suggestions until after this 
~econd Draft had been written. Although it had been sug-
gested and discussed earlier it is evident that at this 
time it was borrowed from Smutsl Plan with very little 
change. ( 1) 
________ " ______ _ 
1. Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol.I, 
p. 225, and Seymour, C., The ·-:rnn·inaTe!5aPers~olonel 
House, vol.IV, p.286. ·- --
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explaining his ideas for the mandates 
Wilson's fifth point of the "celebrated 
In this Wilson had insisted that the rights 
of the governed in the territories whose fates were to be 
decided should have equal weight with those of the governors. 
Smuts had ruled out the German colonies because he thought 
that to give Alsace-Lorraine to Brance would merely return 
what belonged to her. He believed the German colonies of 
Africa were inhabited by people who were too backward to 
know anything about their own interests. Wilson included both 
of these territories under his plan for mandates. He had 
probably seen references to such projects in a report given 
him by House. This report had been pEepared by George Louis 
Beer in a memorandum on Mesopotamia. Although both Wilson 
and House had had this information and although the former 
had said on the "george Washington" that the German colonies 
should be declared the property of the League of Nations and 
should be administered by small nations, the resources of 
each colony being available to all members of the League", 
neither of them included any provision of this type in his 
first draft. It was only after the President had seen 
Smuts' Draft that he had included it in his own. 
1. Baker, R. s., woodrow Wilson_~~d Vvorl~~et~lement, vol. II, 
p.28. 
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House gives .:il.:on ( l) credi-::; for the clause concerning 
the r1ghtc of nations to interfere and to report on others 
•. to prevent WBr, but it is also ~easonable to assume that it 
may have come fror:1 the Phillimore Report. The agreement 
~ith recard to labor he had talked over with House, but tho 
one on racial ancl :>olicious equality must have been his 
own since no one else wished to claim it. 
President '.Hlson finished this Second Draft on Januar~~ 8, 
1918, and discussed it with House that nieht at dinner. The 
Colonel thought it a c;reat improvement over the First Draft. 
The Second Draft vas printed and copies of it were given to 
the Arnerican Commissione!'s and to certain :Sritish leaders 
on January 10. It gave everyone, for the first time, an 
accurate idea o~ what the President wanted in the Leacue. 
Ho'.l.se go..vo !.Tiller his copy of the draft on Janua:•y 11 and 
asJ'::ed him on behalf of the President to mal:e comments on it. 
Miller complied and prepared an elaborate paper. (2) 
·;:ilson had asked House to give a copy of his Second Draft 
to Lord Robert Cecil. He hoped that it would result in an 
Anglo-A .. '11erican draft. House became ill so the matter was 
placed in Miller's hands. Miller does not say in his report 
of events -~·rhether or not his own suggestions '.':e1,e formulated 
1. Seymour, C., The Intimate Papers 0f Colonel House, 
vol. I'J, p .. 28G. 
2. Miller, D.Il., Draftine the Covenant, vol.I, p.45. 
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before or u.fter consultins the British. The President 
received suegestions from a number of others but Baker 
says that he used only those of General Tasker H. Bliss 
and David Hunter Miller. (l) This is true only in part 
because a study of the new material in the Third Draft 
indicates that he must have also referred to I,lr. Lansing's 
sugsestlons. 
The first changes in the President's Third Draft were 
the re::mlt of the recommendations of General Bliss. 
Folloning his suggestion the words 11 and Orderly Government" 
in the preamble 'flere omitted because some nations might 
think that the League would interfere ·::ith internal 
disorders. 'i/ilson also accepted his advice as to the use 
of the word "covenant" throughout the whole document. In 
~clvi~i\'\9_ 
Article III he c; G d adding "as against external 
o.ggressionn to the guarantee for "politicul independence and 
territorial integrity". For Article IV he thought it 
v1ould be better to have the Council act to form.ulate 
reduction of armaments. If such action was taken by the 
large body of delegates, a small power miGht veto such an 
i::r..portant matter. ( 2) In Article V he advised a lL-:1it of 
one year on the Council v:hen deciding u. dispute. ( 3) 
1. 
() 
~. 
3. 
Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and the ~orld ~ar, vol,I, 
p.229 -
Mill·0r, D.E., Drafting the Covenant, Vol.II, p.9'1. 
Ibid., vol.II, p.95. 
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In Article VI the President changed his wording so 
that the article v10uld comply with United States law. 
Instead of declaring that any state breaking the covenants 
(under Article V) "shall thereby ipso facto become at war 
with all members of the League", it read in the new draft 
"it shall thereby ipso facto be deemed to have committed an 
act of war against all members of the League". This change 
may have been made because of Miller's views or because 
of Lansing's ideas. (1) 
The next change was made in the third supplementary 
agreement. Two paragraphs were added. The first, conforming 
to the suggestion:· of General Bliss, provided for the 
expense of talcing over a mandate. If the expenses could 
not be borne by the people of the country, assessments were 
to be levied on members of the League in proportion to 
their national budgets. The second paragraph described just 
what a mandatory would need to accomplish, "to build up 
in as short a time as possible out of the people or 
territory under its guardianship a political unit ·which can 
take charge of its own affairs, determine its own connections, 
and choose its own policies." (2) 
In Agreement IV reference to the Empires of Austria-
Hungary and Turkey was omitted, perhaps at Mr. Miller's 
1. Ililler, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.49. 
2. Ibid., vol.II, p.1o4. 
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suggestion that the League of Nations was not to be a 
successor to the Empires. 
Agreement VI which recommended racial and religious 
equality for minorities was amended to include a clause 
that the Executive Council should exact a promise to that 
effect from all states seeking admission to the League. 
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The Freedom of Religions Agreement, VII, probably was 
the President's idea based upon the well-knovm American 
tradition guaranteeing freedom of religious belief. It 
could not have been included to please the Jews, because 
the preceding agreement covered their case. {1) 
Agreement VIII may have been susJested by Lansing or 
Miller. The former had suggested that international law be 
codified for peace time and war time on land and sea and 
in the air. {2) Miller's idea was "that interference with 
a vessel on the high seas or with aircraft not sanctioned 
by law of nations" would be an impairment of political 
independence. ( 3) Y/ilson must have followed Miller here 
rather than Lansing because Lansing emphasized formulating 
the code, while Miller assumes that it has already been 
done as does Wilson. (4) 
1. Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 
vol.I, p.230. 
2. Lansing, H., The Peace Negotiations, p.64. 
3. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.II, p.92. 
4. Baker, R.S., \'loodrow 'Nilson and fiorld Settlement, 
vol.I, pp.230-l. 
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Agreement IX, which provides for publishing treaties 
made betvreen countries was sugcested by Lansing in Article 
V, paragraph I of his International Agreements which he 
had handed to the President on January 7 at a conference 
betvreen 1:lilson and the American Commissioner. ( 1) It vras 
also suggested by Miller. (2) 
Agreement X providins\~hat there v;ould be no discrim-
ination in trade ae;n.inst any pov;er which was a member of 
the League was probably borrowed from !1!r. Lansing. (3) 
The President completed his Third Draft on January 20. 
Cecil completed a British draft at the same time and sent 
a copy around to United States hec.dquE:.rters. \"lilson had 
tried in \his draft to reconcile all views, but he realized 
after reading the British Draft that there ·:1ere still 
many differences which would have to be settled in personal 
conferences. At this time the President was so busy in 
the Council of Ten that it was impossible for him to rvrite 
another draft. David Hunter rHller, legal advisor for the 
United States; and G.J.B. Hurst who held a similar position 
with Great Britain, v;ere comnissioned to make a composite 
draft. This draft, usually called the Hurst-Tiiiller Draft, 
was used for discussion when the Commission to draft the 
1. Lansing, R., The Peace Negotiat1ons, p. 92. 
2. Miller, D.H.,.Drafting the Covenant, vol.II, p.92 
3, Lansing, R., The Peace Negotiations, p.66. 
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Covenant for the League of Nations met. (1) 
President Wilson went over the Hurst-Miller Draft on 
the evening of February 2. He did not like it. He said 
that it had no warmth or color in it. {2) Some of the items 
that he had considered important had been left out. (3) 
He asked House and Miller to take his Third Draft and 
rewrite it, taking over the clauses on religious equality, 
publication of future treaties and prevention of commercial 
discrimination among members of the League from the Hurst-
Miller Draft. Mr. Miller spent that night and the next 
day in carrying out the President's wishes. {4) The printed 
copies were in the President's hands on the morning of 
February 3. His note to Mr. Miller states, "I hope with 
all my heart that it will serve as the basis of the work 
of the Drafting Commission." 
This Fourth Draft, prepared by House and Miller for 
the President had very few changes. In the preamble a new 
phrase modifying "In order to secure international peace 
and security" and reading "by the acceptance of obligations 
not to resort to the use of armed force" was included. 
Miller had written this into the Hurst-Miller Draft 
1. Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, vol.I, 
p.232. 
2. Seymour, C., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 
vol.IV, p.302. 
3. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.72. 
4. Seymour, c., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 
vol.IV, p.30l. 
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because he knew that House wanted some statement aeainst 
war in the preamble. (1) They included it in Wilson's 
Fourth Draft, too. 
In Article III the parts dealing with territorial 
adjustments were omitted, due perhaps to the influence of 
the British drafts. In Article IV they omitted the clause 
dealing with abolition of compulsory military duty and 
substituted a provision for inquiring into the feasibility 
of abolishing it. This change vvas in compliance with 
Italian opinlon and had been agreed to by ·wilson at a 
meeting with Orlando on January 30. Article V provided 
that either party to a dispute or the Executive Council 
might bring the dispute before the Executive Council. The 
time clause allowing the Council t·welve months to render 
a decision was omitted. 
The more important changes were those involving the 
provisions for mandates. Differences were greatest on this 
subject between the United States and Great Britain. They 
were settled at meetings between representatives of the 
two powers and at meetings of the Council of Ten. {2) 
In the President's Second Draft he had referred only 
to "peoples and territories which formerly belonged to 
Austria-Hungary and to Turkey and in respect of the colonies 
1. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.68. 
2. Ibid., vol.I, p.l05. 
formerly under the dominion of the German Empire". He 
retained this form in his Third Draft which was finished 
on January 20. The days that followed were filled with 
conferences which explain the changes made in the Fourth 
Draft. Temperley says that the stand of Australia and 
South Africa on this question was the rock on which the 
whole project very nearly split. (1) Although everyone 
agreed that Germany's colonies should not be returned to 
56. 
her they disagreed violently as to the distribution of 
them. The British Colonial Premiers, Hughes of Australia 
and Massey of New Zealand, insisted that the colonies 
south of the Equator• were necessary to them for protection. 
General Smuts who had enunciated the mandates principle 
argued for direct annexation of territory adjacent to his 
own Dominion of South Africa. (2) Lloyd George was in 
favor of the principles of mandatory governments, but he 
·uas also in favor of the British colonies getting what 
they wanted first. Lord Robert Cecil with whom House 
conferred agreed more nearly with the President but knew 
that he could not swing the others to his way of thinking.{3) 
Balfour said very definitely that the British delegates 
did not object to the principle of mandates as applied to 
territory conquered by British arms and managed from 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Temperley, H.T.v., A History of the Peace Conference, 
vol.II, p.26. 
Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, ~ol.I, 
p.266. 
Seymour, C., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, 
vol.IV, p.296. 
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London, but as applied to areas conquered by the self-
governing dominions. The French supported the British and 
were very plain-spoken about the matter. They did not 
believe in the mandatory system or in the League of Nations 
as methods for dealing with the colonies. They wanted the 
Cameroons and Togo and they wanted annexation pure and 
simple. The Japanese supported this side because of their 
interests in the Pacific. The Italians were willing to 
support the President when it developed that the territory 
that they wanted vras not involved. Lansing, Wilson's 
Secretary of State, was secretly against him. (l} 
When it became evident in the Council of Ten that 
Wilson would not abandon his position the English and 
French newspapers began an attack upon him. He threatened 
to retaliate by giving out his side of the question. At 
this stage Smuts submitted a resolution which defined the 
three classes of mandates. 
l. 
2. 
A. Those that would need only administrative 
advice and assistance until they were able to 
stand alone. This referred to certain communities 
formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire. (2) 
B. Those, especially Central Africa, in which 
mandatory must be responsible for the administratio 
Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement,vol.I, 
p.266, and Lans1ng, H., The Peace Negotiations, pp.83-4. 
Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.llO. 
! 
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of the territory. 
C. Those such as South West Africa and Islands 
which could be administered under the mandatory 
state as integral portions thereof. 
The resolution comprising these definitions was adopted 
by the Council of Ten after two meetings for discussion. 
The changes that the President made in his Third Draft 
with regard to mandates followed this resolution almost 
word for word. The experience taught him that the less 
controversial material in the Covenant the better the 
chances were for getting it through the Conference. There 
was nothing definite said at the meetings of the Council of 
Ten as to which country would have which mandate, but it 
seemed to be taken for granted that the secret agreements 
made before the United States came into the war would be 
kept. This incident is considered by historians as the 
first crisis of the Conference and the President came 
through it with colors flying. It was indicative, however, 
of what he would have to face all through the peace 
proceedings. It was to be a fight between the new ideals 
and the old. 
From the foregoing discussions of the Drafts that the 
president wrote it will be seen that he was the author of 
very little, if any, of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. His first draft was based on the House Draft 
which in turn followed the Phillimore Report. It provided 
I ====~F====================================================~r -
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for organized meetings of representatives of the nations 
of the world, for a permanent secretariat, qualified 
guarantees of territorial independence, disarmament and 
obligatory arbitration of disputes and for the use of 
force against a state that went to war. His Second Draft, 
written in Paris after he had studied the Smuts and 
Phillimore plans, was somewhat different. He dropped 
compulsory arbitration, adopted the idea of an Executive 
Council, the plan for a system of mandates, the sanction 
of an ipso facto war, and added one agreement which looked 
to the welfare of labor as a group and another suggesting 
the treatment for racial and religious minorities within 
countries. His Third Draft was changed following the 
suggestions of General Bliss, Mr. Lansing, and Mr. Miller. 
None of these changes were great, but were made in an 
effort to reconcile the views of everybody. When a new 
draft was drawn up at the same time by Lord Cecil, the 
President realized that he would have to make still more 
changes in order to insure British agreement. The greatest 
difference was with regard to the inclusion of the mandates 
resolution adopted by the Council of Ten to please the 
British. 
It is interesting here to note that included in the 
twenty-two articles comprising the Hurst-Miller Draft 
which was to form the basis of discussion at the 
commission chosen to draft the Covenant of the League were 
60. 1 
nine articles from the President's drafts and three others 
which contained ideas that he had included, but which were 
in different phrases. 
Colonel House who had preceded Wilson to Paris 
believed that it was important for him to meet the persons 
who were to represent .the European Powers at the Peace 
Conference before the meetings began. Such contacts he 
hoped would make for cordial relations between the 
President and with those with whom he would work later at 
the Conference table. Arrangements were made for two 
meetings with Clemenceau, one on December 17 and another 
on December 19. On the 21st with Colonel House he met 
Orlando and Sonniua but could not convince the Italians 
at that time that they should give up the Pact of London. 
During the Christmas season which he spent in London he 
talked with Lloyd George, Balfour and Bonar Law. Back in 
Paris he talked again with the Italians and at another 
time with Smuts, Cecil, House and liiiller. The first of 
these informal meetings served to sound out opinion. 
Those which continued throughout January served to smooth 
out differences as to the content of the Covenant before 
the formal discussions took place. 
The President was "unalterably determined" that the 
League should be an integral part of the treaty. He was 
supported by Lord Robert Cecil. Neither Lloyd George nor 
Clemenceau really cared. On the first day of the Peace 
II 
61. 
Conference, January 18, 1919, the French presented a plan 
of procedure which put the League of Nations last on the 
list of things to be considered. On the second day Wilson 
introduced a list of subjects with the League first on the 
list. The British at this point began to draft a resol-
ution recommending that discussion of the League be placed 
in the hands of a committee. (1) They submitted it to the 
Supreme Council on January 21. It was endorsed on 
January 22 with slight verbal changes by the President, 
and approved without opposition or discussion as submitted 
by him to the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference. (2) 
This resolution provided for the creation of a league 
of nations. It further stated that it should be an 
integral part of the gnneral Treaty of Peace, that members 
should meet periodically, that there should be a permanent 
organization to function when the League was not in session 
(3) and that a committee·~ should be appointed to work out 
the details of the constitution and functions of the League. 
The personnel of such a committee was discussed at 
the Council meeting on the day that the resolution was 
endorsed. The President asked Lloyd George if he thought 
that delegates should form the co~~ittee and George agreed 
vol· 
1. Baker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and wo.rld Settlement, "I,p.236 
2. Seymour,C., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol.IV, 
pp.289-90. 
3. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, 76. 
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that they should. He also was of the opinion that they 
should be persons who had already studied the question and 
suggested that Ceeil and Smuts should serve for England. 
Wilson, a good strategist, elected to work on the committee 
himself which gave it an importance that it could not have 
had otherwise. (1) 
Ray Stannard Baker says that Wilson wanted the Leaeue 
to be discussed in the more important councils at the 
conference and believes that the British and other powers 
side-tracked it into a committee so that their time might 
be spent on the more lucrative work of dividing the spoils. 
On the other side of the argument are House, Wiseman, (2) 
Miller and Tardieu. All of them indicate in their writings 
that Wilson knew the work would have to be done by a 
commission. Certainly this group has the more logical 
point of view. Miller says that Rilson himself suggested 
a commission to the council of ten. (3) That body would 
have been no place in which to make a draft for the League; 
their interests were on matters which they considered more 
important. In this commission were some of the most ardent 
exponents of a League. Baker felt that the League's 
opponents tried to make the commission large and unwieldy 
1. B~ker, R.S., Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 
vol. I, pp. 237-242. ------ ----
2. Reporter on the "Daily Mail", Lord Northcliffe 1 s paper. 
This paper backed the League of Nations idea. Wiseman 
was extremely helpful in creating the right public 
opinion in England and France. 
3. Mill~ D.H. ,_Dra~~~I!_§,_ ~h~ _c.?~~B~5t .. ~'=-=v==o=l=·==J=~-'~~D.=·==8=3=·======tt=== 
by giving the smaller powers places on it. Miller points 
out that with the hot feeline that these little ones had 
about the smaller councils doing all the important work 
it would have been unheard of to omit them here. (l) It 
would have been difficult indeed for Wilson, after all 
that he had said about the importance of public opinion, 
not to welcome a large representation of smaller powers. 
As a matter of fact they did very little talking in the 
meetings of the commission if one excepts Belgium who 
would have had a place in any case because of her contri-
bution to the allied cause. If the powers had had any 
intention of killing the League they could have done so 
easily by keeping the discussion of its fate in the 
63. 
Conference where it would have soon passed out from either 
neglect or exposure before the frieid blasts of Clemenceau's 
criticism. Moreover, Baker himself declares (2) that 
while at the time of the armistice Wilson dominated world 
opinion, that at the peace conference he was leader of 
the opposition and undoubtedly the minority, and as such 
he would have had less influence in the Conference than 
he had as chairman of the committee. 
The meetings of the Commission were held in the rooms 
of Colonel House at the Hotel Crillon. Vmitney H. 
Shepherdson describes the settine as follows: 11 There is 
1. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.84. 
2. Baker, R.S., Woodrov1 V/ITson and ·;iorld Settlement, 
vol.I, p.l03. ---··--·-~---·-
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nothing particularly impressive about Room 351. It is the 
kind of reception room that may be found in many a French 
hotel. It is large, high, and decorated in the rather 
elaborate l<,rench style. But whatever its appearance may 
be while it is used for everyday purposes, it assumed a 
wholly different look during the meetings of the Commission. 
In the center of the room, a big round table covered with 
a red cloth. Around the table nineteen chairs for the 
nineteen members of the Commission. Slightly behine yet 
scattered through this circle of seats, a number of other 
chairs for French and English translators. In the corners 
three or four desks, and around the walls occasional chairs 
for any secretaries whom the members might care to bring 
with them. All in all, the table might have been laid for 
a meeting of the Cabinet or an American board of directors." 
(1) 
Baker says that the stage was cunningly set by House. 
Wilson as chairman sat at the head of the table. Tardieu 
says that he "discussed like a college professor 
criticizing a thesis, sitting bolt upright in his armchair, 
inclining his head at times toward his advisors, developing 
his views with the abundant clearness of a didactic logician. "1 
( 2) Beside il'ilson sat Colonel House also representing the 
1. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.l20. 
2. Tardieu, A., Truth about the Treati, p.l03. 
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United States. He spoke at only one meeting when the 
President was away and when it was necessary for the United 
States delegate to give an opinion. On the other side of 
the chairman sat Lord Robert Cecil who represented the 
British Empire and who v:&s one of the more co1mnanding figures 
at Paris. He was simple and charming. Also representing 
the Empire was General Jan C. Smuts, Minister of Defense 
of the Union of South Africa. For France, M. Leon Bourgeois, 
former President of the Council of Ministers and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and M. Larande, Dean of the Faculty of 
Law at Paris, two very able lawyers, both of whom spoke 
often and fluently. (1) Clemenceau who felt that the 
league was too visionary an-undertaking to be useful let 
them work with practically no directions from him. (2) 
Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, President of the Council, and 
M. Scialoja, a senator, represented Italy. The former 
combined practical views with a great knowledge of inter-
national law. (3) The Japanese gentlemen, Baron Makino (4) 
and Count Chinda, (5) representing a country that had so 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
House and Seymour, The Making of the League of Nations, 
p.398. 
Wilson and Clemenceau did not clash over the League for 
this reason. Their real quarrels came over other 
matters. House says that "it was not as much a duel as 
a general melee, in which the representatives of each 
nation struggled to secure endorsement for their 
particular methods of securing the peace." 
House and Seymour, The Making of the League of Nations, 
p.398. 
~ormer Mtnister of Foreign Affairs, Member of the lplomatlc Counc1 . mbassador Extraordinary and Planipotentiary of H.I.M. 
the Emperor of Japan. ____ --= _ _ ~ ~-=- _- _ _ __ _ :::.:-- __ ____ -- :...:::·--_ 
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recently taken her place as a great power, appropriately 
spoke very little. !II. Hymans, minister of Poreign Affairs 
and Secretary of State for Belgium, a fiery, brilliant 
orator, represented that country often and vociferously. 
M. Pessoa of Brazil, although impressive, spoke seldom. 
~ellington Koo, China's minister at Washington was one of 
the best and most restrained orators present. M. Reis, 
representing Portugal and M. Vestnitch for Serbia spoke 
occasionally. After the fourth meeting four more represen-
tatives were sent from Poland, Greece, Roumania, Servia 
and Czecho-Slovakia which brought the total membership up 
to nineteen. 
The Commission held fifteen meetings all together. 
During the eleven days from Pebruary 3 to February 13 
there were eleven meetings and then after President Wilson 
returned from America they held four more, March 24, 25 
and again April 10 and 11. This large group of delegates 
made a record of unbroken attendance at the meetings. They 
arrived on time. Each person found on his table a revised 
copy of the draft together with typed copies of any 
amendment that was to be proposed during the meeting. No 
time was lost in translatirig, it was done in an undertone as 
the speaker talked. The meetings were very simple, each 
man wore what was convenient to the meeting and they were 
held morning, afternoon, or evening, whenever the important 
members were free from other duties. There were no orations. 
- - ,_ - --
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Plain speaking prevailed. It was agreed that the meetings 
should be informal. Frank and free discussion was encouraged. 
No secretaries were brought in until the third meeting. 
Wilson said that he wanted to be able to change his views 
without having what he had said before read to him. 
The President, as chairman, suggested that the Covenant 
be read article by article and discussed informally. (1) 
No one stood up except Wilson for his opening speech. After 
an article was read amendments were suggested and discussed 
and either voted upon or withdrawn as opinion seemed to 
indicate. Proceedings were usually in English rather than 
French because the document under discussion was written in 
that language. 
Since the English and Americans had a draft all ready, 
the Hurst-Miller Draft, they were in a position to control 
the situation and the French, supported by Belgium had to 
assume the role of opposition which they felt put them in 
a very bad light. Any suggestions which they wished to 
make, unfortunately for them,appeared in the form of 
objection to majority opinion. (2) 
The first reading of the Covenant was completed in 
eight meetings by February 11. It is impossible within the 
scope of this paper to review in any detail the work done 
1. Miller, D.H., My Diary at the Conference of Paris, 
vol. V, p. 37. 
2. Ibid, vol. V, p.343. 
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by the commission but it is interesting to note which 
articles caused the greatest amount of discussion. 
The first of these had to do with the rights and 
privileges of the smaller powers. Four representatives 
from the smaller states had been added to the fifteen 
members already on the commission, not because it was 
thought desirable to have a larger group, but because it 
was felt that better feeling would prevail among the 
smaller powers if they were so recognized. Their rights 
came into the discussions again when the article with 
regard to membership on the Council was read. Cecil felt 
that the larger powers would be expected to carry the 
greater part of the responsibility in such an organization 
as the League and therefore should keep the Council to 
themselves. Under no consideration would a great power 
submit to being voted down in the Council meetings by the 
smaller powers. Vestnitch, Hymans and Koo, speaking for 
the smaller powers, said that they would resent being thus 
discriminated against. President Wilson suggested that if 
there would be no objection to a membership of five great 
powers and a minority of smaller powers an amendment could 
be drafted to that effect. This was done, but debate con-
tinued at the third meeting and it was not definitely 
decided to give the smaller powers four representatives on 
the Council until the ninth meeting. 
The second important discussion centered about the 
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phrase "a self-governing state". The article read, 
"Admission to the League of States who are not signatories 
of this Covenant requires the assent of not less than 
two-thirds of the Body of Delegates." (1) The other qual-
ification for membership was that the State conform to the 
League's standards of military and naval forces and 
armaments. 
President 'Nilson, after reading the article, proposed 
this amendment; insert at the beginning of the second 
paragraph "Only self-governing States shall be admitted to 
membership in the League; colonies enjoying full powers 
of self-government may be admitted; but--" It was this 
amendment which aroused the discussion. Immediately there 
was an attempt made to define a self-governing state. Lord 
Cecil objected to the wording because if the article was 
so phrased it would not apply to India which had as much 
self-government as England felt it could safely be given. 
It had contributed heavily to the war and yet was not 
considered by the world at large as having self-government 
in the real sense of the word. Wilson agreed to all this 
but felt that if the wording were changed to include India 
it would then include the Philippines which were certainly 
not ready to be admitted to the League. He felt, however, 
1. Article 6 of Hurst-Miller Draft. 
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that since this was the only place in the Covenant that the 
principle of democracy for which the armies had fought was 
mentioned that it should be included. General Smuts came 
to the rescue with the suggestion that India would be a 
signatory member and would not be a problem at all. This 
saved the situation as far as Wilson and Cecil were con-
cerned but the two French statesmen were !eft in doubt as 
to the correct definition of a self-governing state. The 
Article was adopted with the President's amendment. (1) 
e·,shth . At the ~ meet1ng the Prench presented a number 
of amendments. Some of these merely clarified what the 
others assumed was in the spirit of the text. Those which 
they were most anxious to include and to which there was 
most objection provided for international supervision of 
armaments and for an international military force. In 
article VIII, after the phrase "The Bxecutive Council shall 
formulate plans for effecting such reduction" insert the 
following paragraphs; "Il instituera un controle inter-
national des effectifs et des armements et les Hautes 
Parties Contractantes et engagent a s 1 y soumettre en toute 
bonne foi. 
Il deterl11l.inera les conditions dans les_quelles 
doivent etre assur~~e ~llne fa~on permanente 1 1 existence et 
l'organisation de la force internationale." 
1. Miller, D.H., My Diary at the Conference of Paris, 
vol. I, p. 357. 
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The French in explaining the need for these dwelt on 
the fact that France must have a feeling of safety from the 
League. Unless there was some way of bringing a large 
force to her aid in time of danger she could not feel this 
security. Public opinion demanded such reassurance. 
President Wilson pointed out that in the United States one 
of the greatest criticisms aimed at the League was that 
United States troops wou}.d be under the control of some 
other country and could be called out at any time to do its 
bidding. It was: against out' constitution and he simply 
could not subscribe to it for that reason. Cecil said that 
he could not for the same reason. The French replied that 
as far as they were concerned the League vms nothing but 
a philosophical treatise without it. (1) The session closed 
with feelings somewhat strained. On the following day at 
the tenth meeting while· Lord Robert Cecil was in the chair 
the question came up again but when the amendment was put 
to a vote it was defeated. 
The relieious article, another controversial topic, 
-
would no doubt have been passed as a polite gesture to 
President Wilson had not the Japanese decided to attach to 
it their racial equality amendment. This article, 19 of the 
Hurst-Miller Draft, read; "The High Contracting Parties 
agree that they will make no law prohibiting or interfering 
1. Steed, H.w., Through Thirty Years, vol.II, p.282. 
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with the free exercise of religion, and that they will in 
no way discriminate, either in law or in fact against those 
who practice any particular creed, religion or belief whose 
practices are not inconsistent with public order or public 
morals." During the sixth meeting when this was first read 
Hymans, Reis and Orlando spoke rather weakly against it a.s 
it was worded. It was referred to the drafting committee 
who recommended "that in view of the complications of the 
question it would be preferable to omit this article 
altogether." If, however, it was to be included they 
suggested that a milder wording be used. ~hen it was read 
for the second time at the tenth meeting the President was 
absent but Mr. House reminded the Commission how important 
it had been to him. M. Larnaude remarked that even so it 
was a difficult clause to include. Then for the first time 
the Japanese proposed an amendment. Baron Makino reminded 
them that racial and religious animosities had been 
fruitful sources of trouble throughout history. He pointed 
out that since different races had fought together for a 
common cause during the v1ar that it was only fitting that 
the equality of men be admitted and be made the basis of 
future intercourse. Lord Cecil answered the speech by 
saying that it was a matter of a highly controversial 
.. character within the British Empire and had better be 
postponed for examination. This did not end the matter for 
at the final meeting of the commission the Japanese brought 
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forward a similar cl&.use to be inserted in the preamble. 
The text of the Covenant was to be presented to a 
-
Plenary Session of the Conference on February 14. President 
Y'lilson, as chairman of the Commission, read the Covenant 
and then spoke briefly with regard to the aims of the 
League. Lord Robert Cecil, representing Great Britain 
followed him, agreeing with him in every respect. M. 
Orlando, speaking in French was also in agreement, offering 
the League as a monument to those who gave their lives 
during the war. M. Leon Bourgeois, representing France, 
expressed the view of their delegates. He assented to the 
principles embodied in the League but also aired the 
reservations with regard to the international force that 
they felt necessary. Baron Makino spoke next mentioning 
the fact that he also had a "proposition" in reserve. 
Mr. Barnes spoke for the British Working Classes, 
Ilf. Veniselos for Greece, Tf:r. 'i/ellington Koo for China and 
M. Hustem Haidar for Hedjaz. Hughes of Australia inquired 
when the discussion on the Covenant would be held. 
Clemenceau replied that, "the Covenant had been deposited 
with the Bureau of the Conference for examination and 
discussion by all the interested Powers. The date on which 
the discussion would take place would depend on the com-
pletion of the preliminary examination of the scheme." (1) 
1. Miller, D.H., Draft~ng the Covenant, vol.II, p.578. 
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Wilson left for home that afternoon to return to Paris 
on March 14. Since this paper is concerned with his contri-
~ butions to the Covenant this visit to the United States may 
be mentioned very bfliefly. While at home he invited the 
members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
and the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate to dinner 
at the Vv'hite House on February 26. Mr. Lodge reports, "It 
was a large and very pleasant dinner. After dinner we went 
into the East Room. The President answered questions for 
about two hours about the draft of the constitution of the 
League of Nations, and told us nothing." (1) This dinner 
served only to convince enemies of the Leaeue that they were 
in the rieht. 
Criticisms and suggestions came pouring in from every 
side both in Europe and in America. The President would 
have had the Covenant accepted as it had been drafted and 
would have had any corrections made by the League itself 
after it had gone into operation. Friends of the measure 
finally convinced him that unless some concessions were made 
to the Senate they would never approve the Treaty. 
After Mr. ~ilson had returned to Paris Mr. Taft wired 
him a summary of the Senate's demands: 
"If you bring back the treaty with the Lengue of Nat ions 
in it make more specific reservation of the Monroe Doctrine, 
I 
1. Lodge, H.C., The Senate and the League of Nations, p.lOOj 
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fix a term for duration of the League, and the limit of 
armament, require expressly unanimity of action in the 
Executive Council and Body of Delegates, and add to Article 
15 a provision that where the Executive Council of the Body 
of Delegates finds the difference to grow out of an exclu-
sively domestic policy, it shall recommen~ no settlement, 
the ground will be completely cut from under the opponents 
of the League in the Senate. Addition to Article 15 will 
answer objection to Japanese immigration, as well as tariffs 
under Article 21. Reservation of the Monroe Doctrine might 
be as follows: .•••••• Monroe Doctrine reservation alone 
would probably carry the treaty, but others would make it 
certain." (1) Other proposals came from the British, French 
and the Neutrals, but none of these were particularly 
contentious. 
The Monroe Doctrine caused more discussion than any of 
the other American demands, not because it really mattered 
to the members of the Commission except perhaps to the 
Chinese who had the problem of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine 
uncomfortably near at home, but because Lloyd George was 
using it as a means to get Wilson's consent to a ship-
building agreement. It put the American representatives in 
1. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.277. 
Mr. Taft's wording for r~~onroe Doctrine amendment is not 
given here because it was not used. 
~) 
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a very difficult position, that of doing exactly the sort 
of private bargaining that they had deplored. After much 
discussion in small groups and v~iting of notes and letters 
among Cecil, Balfour, Miller, George and Wilson, England 
finally agreed that it might be included. The Senate would 
not accept the treaty without the change. For the ships 
that had already been authorized by Congress there was 
nothing the President could do. The act as passed by 
Congress only allowed him to suspend further building. (1) 
The Article covering the Monroe Doctrine finally became 
1\rti cle 21. The pJlrase 11 or understandings 11 was added to 
satisfy Mr. Koo 1 s doubts as to future Japanese interpre-
tations of the article. 
The second American amendment providing for withdrawal 
at the end of ten ye0rs aroused long and heated debate. 
Mr. Wilson presented it in this form at the thirteenth 
meeting: "After the expiration of ten years from the rati-
fication of the Treaty of Peace of which this Covenant 
forms a part, any State a member of the League may, after 
giving one year's notice of its intention, withdraw from 
the League, provided all its international obligations anfr 
all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been 
fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal. 11 (2) 
1. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.424. 
2. Ibid., vol.I, p.042. 
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The French pointed out that if such a provision were 
included it would give rise to a feeling of insecurity and 
instability with regard to the League. That no one would 
expect it to be a success. That countries not belonging 
would ally themselves against it. That it \'laS the only 
reference to a particular country in the whole document. 
President Wilson replied that he, personally, felt that any 
nation once a member was morally obligated to remain so 
but that the United States could not enter at all unless 
this clause were included to pacify those who were afraid 
of losing their state sovereignty. The amendment was 
finally added without the ten year limit but with the two 
year notice of its intention to withdraw remaining. 
The question of racial equality was brought up again 
by the Japanese at the last meeting of the Commission. 
They were very anxious to include a clause definitely 
asserting the equality of races, All sorts of ideas were 
behind it, immigration for one. That aspect of the matter 
alone would have kept the British Dominions from ever giving 
their consent to its inclusion in the Covenant. The 
Japanese had visited Mr. House repeatedly with regard to it. 
Vlhen they failed in their attempt to include it in Mr. 
Wilson's "religious freedom" article they planned to add it 
to the preamble. The amendment lost when put to a vote. 
After the fifteenth meeting of the Commission on 
April 11, 1919, the Covenant went to a drafting committee 
I) 
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named by Mr. ';Vilson. On April 28, 1919, at three o'clock 
it was presented at the Plenary Session of the Peace 
Conference. The President did not read the Covenant this 
time but merely called attention to the changes that had 
been made since February 14. Baron Makino then stated the 
aims of the Japanese in presenting their amendment but did 
not press the matter. !vi. Hymans spoke on the choice of 
Geneva for the seat of the League. Both French delegates 
spoke but did not insist upon their claims. The Covenant 
was adopted with a short amendment, a legal necessity, 
proposed by Mr. 'Nilson. It became Part I of the Treaty of 
Versailles. 
We have the reports of those who attended the meetings 
of the Commission to help us see the part that Wilson played. 
David Hunter Miller, legal advisor for the American 
Delegation to the conference, says, "The meetings were 
greatly dominated by President ~ilson. The whole tone of 
the speeches, when differing from his views conveyed the 
aim of convincing him, which indeed they sometimes did. 
But to his final opinions there was unmistakeable deference, 
with the possible exception, in some cases of the French 
delegates." (1) House says, "Practically everything 
originates with Cecil or Wilson. Wilson excells in this 
kind of work." (2} 
1. Miller, D.H., My Diary at the Conference of Paris, vol.I, 
.053. 
2. . ~-~~-our, C., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, v~l. I'-'p,31 
) 
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As one reads the minutes of the meetings he finds that 
Wilson is always bringing the orators of the group back to 
the point and smoothing away objections to get things 
through. Ivlany an apparently impossible deadlock is 
avoided by the matter being placed in the hands of a 
committee at the crucial moment instead of being lost by a 
premature vote. As chairman he had the privilege of reading 
and explaining articles as they were considered and thus 
was able by the inflection of his voice and manner of! reading 
to put his own interpretation before the committee first. 
Mr. Wilson was an expert speaker. It would be unusual 
indeed if he did not use his gift in a cause so near to his 
heart. He controlled the committee aside from the force 
of his personality by ruling arbitrarily on votes. Usually 
decisions were decided by a majority but on the question of 
racial equality he ruled a unanimous vote which gave the 
British ~he force of a majority in a small minority position. 
There were objections raised by the French but he defended 
his decision ably. (1) 
There were in all sixty-eight amendments or changes 
of wording made during the fourteen meetings. Of these 
V/ilson proposed twenty-six, Cecil as delegate for England 
and as chairmun of the drafting committee twenty-five, 
France five, China, Japan and Se~bia each two, and South 
1. Miller, D.H., Drafting the Covenant, vol.I, p.464. 
so. 
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Africa and Serbia one apiece. Of those that 'Nilson proposed, 
sixteen were passed, two were lost and six were referred to 
committees. Of those that Cecil offered, twenty were 
accepted, t'NO of which had been changed somewhat in wording 
by Wilson. Three Prench amendments were accepted. If one 
remembers when reading these figures that Vlilson usually 
had the support of Cecil and he that of 'dilson one can 
understand to what extent they are responsible for the 
contents of the Covenant. (l) 
Much important work was done in sub-committees, in 
conversations and in correspondence. The drafting committee 
composed of Cecil, Smuts, Orlando, Koo and Miller are 
responsible for many minor changes in wording and shades 
of meaning. House and Cecil met often and the former 
modestly admits that they did nearly all the difficult work 
between meetings so that there would be no friction during 
the meetings. A careful reading of the minutes leaves one 
with the impression that the J?rench and Belgian delegates 
could not have taken part in these meetings. 
General Smuts sums up Wilson's work at the conference 
in an article written for Current Opinion. 11 0nly a man of 
great power and inf~uence and dogged determination could 
·-·--------·----
1. This conclusion is the result of a careful check of the 
minutes of the fifteen meetings of the commission. 
--- -- -· 
--· - ·- -- -- - - ---- ----
81. 
have carried the Covenant through the peace conference. 
Others had perhaps given more thought to the elaboration of 
the great plan. But his was the power and the will that 
carried it through." (1) 
Although Mr. Wilson did not write the Covenant many of 
his ideas are there. He was tireless in his efforts to 
combine the ideas of everyone else into an acceptable 
document. By the wise use of his powers and privileges as 
chairman. of the commission he was able to influence the 
group in such a way that the League was nearly as he wished 
it to be. The belief in his ideals and the force and 
determination in his character which made the League possible 
were no doubt also his undoing. The person who can accom-
plish such work must have a singleness of purpose amounting 
almost to fanaticism. That quality helped him win the 
League in Europe. It was probably the cause of his losing 
it in America. Although he knew of the opposition to the 
League at home he did nothing about it until his enemies 
had the Senate well oreanized and public opinion well 
drugged. Then he planned a country wide tour to appeal to 
the people. Wilson had a reformer's desire to give the 
people of the world a fair chance. He idealized them and 
never seemed to lose his faith in their ability to see the 
right and to support it. With this end in view he planned 
1. curren~~pinion, April, 1921. 
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the western tour. His physician warned him that such an 
exhausting campaign vrould be very dangerous.tf) his health. 
The President believed that the cause was worth any risk that 
he might take. (1) He had once said, "Every man has to die. 
It is done only once, and being a single and distinguished 
act, ought to be thrilled through with the purpose of life, 
so that as a man lived and loved, so may he die, striving for 
the things which put the corpuscles of his blood into shouting 
shape whenever great things are nroposed." 
Those who judge Wilson's work at the Peace Conference 
and lament his great failure there think of the Versailles 
Treaty as a whole and not of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. If one thinks of that Assembly as he did, as an 
organization for correcting the mistakes of the treaty which 
he believed to be numerous, and if he thinks of it as an 
assembly that could improve its own organization to fit the 
constantly changing needs of the future, then it is easy to 
believe with Wilson that it was worth his "last single and 
distinguished act." 
------------~--------------------------------------------
1. White, Woodrow Wilson, p. 443 'I 
I 
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APPENDIX 
The Covenant of the League of Nations as included in 
the Treaty of Versailles. Footnotes indicate source of the 
articles, sentences or phrases. 
The High Contracting Parties 
In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve 
international peace and security (1) 
by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, (2) 
by the prescription of open, (3) just and honorable relations 
between nations, 
by the firm establishment of the understandings of inter-
national law as the actual rule of conduct among 
GoverTh~ents, and 
by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for 
all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized 
peoples with one another, 
Agree to this Covenant of the League of Nations. 
Article l. 
1. The original Members of the League of Nations shall be 
those of the Signatories which are named in the Annex to 
1. Found in different form in Wilson's Third Draft, 
January 80, 1919. 
2. Found in different form in Wilson's Fourth Draft, 
February 2, 1919; "not to resort to the use of armed 
force". 
3. Found in Wilson's Second Uraft, January 10, 1919. 
-----lt===========~=-~~~==~-~--~=-==-~~=-==---~=-·==========:=======================i!~l=-=-==-~ 
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tbis Covenant and also such of those other States named in 
the Annex as shall accede without reservation to this 
1: Covenant. (1) Such accession shall be effected by a Declar-
ation deposited with the Secretariat within two months of 
the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall 
be sent to all other members of the League. (2} 
2. Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not 
named in the Annex may become a Member of the League 'if its 
admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, (3) 
provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its 
sincere intention to observe its international obligations, 
and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by 
the League in regard to its military, naval and air forces 
and Armaments. (4) 
3. Any Member of the League may, after two year's notice of 
its intention to do so, withdraw from the League, provided 
that all its international obligations and all its obliga-
tions under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the 
time of its withdrawal. (5) 
1. 
5: 
4. 
5. 
Wilson's suggestion, made at the eleventh meeting, was 
worded "The original Members of the League shall be those 
signatories named in the schedule annexed to the Covenant 
and also those other powers named in the schedule who are 
hereby subsequently to accede to the covenant." 
Drafting Committee's suggestion April 5l 1919. 
First fRund in House Drart, .Art~ cle 22t.ti1n the following 
rorm; A power coul~ come 1n if two- n rds or the 
Assembly invited it. It is also in Wilson's l"irst Draft, 
Article XII. The armament idea was introduced in Smuts' i 
Plan, Article 8. ! 
Wilson's Second Draft, Article XII. 1:.~'::·. Proposed by Cecil at ~hirteenth meeting of the Commission. 
It was adopted after much debate. Wilson had asked for 
a ten-year withdrawal clause because of the insistence of 
the Senate but other members of the Commission felt that 
such a clause would weaken the confidence of nations. 
85. 
Article 2 
The action of the League under this Covenant shall ~--' 
be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and 
of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat. (1) 
Article 3. 
1. The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of the 
Members of the League. {2) 
2. The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals (3) and from 
time to time as occasion may require at the seat of the 
League or at such other place as may be decided upon. (4} 
0. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter 
within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the 
peace of the world. 
4. At meetings of the Assembly each Member of the League 
shall have one vote, and may not have more than three 
representatives. (5) 
Article 4. 
1. The Council shall consist of the Representatives of the 
l. Found in Wilson's First Draft where he uses "Body of 
Delegates instead of 11 of an Assembly". This change of 
wording was made by the drafting committee after it was 
suggested in a British report of April 1, 1919. The idea 
of a small body or "council" within the larger assembly 
was first suggested by Smuts. W~lson incorporated it 
into his later Drafts. 
2. Idea in Phillimore Report, Article 5; in House Draft, 1: 
Article 6; and in Wilson's I?ourth Draft. 
I. 3. Suggested by Wilson at second meeting of Commission. 
4. From vVilson' s l<'ourth Draft, Article 2, and in Hurst-
Miller Draft, Article 2. 
5. Adopted at ninth meeting. 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, together with 
Representatives of four other Members of the League. (1) 
These four Members of the League shall be selected by the 
Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the 
86. 
appointment of the representatives of the four Members of the 
League first selected by the Assembly, Representatives of 
Belgium, Brazil, Spain and Greece shall be members of the 
Council. 
2. With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the 
Council may name additional Members of the League whose 
Representatives shall always be members of the Council; the 
Council with like approval may increase the numbers of 
Members of the League to be selected by the Assembly for 
representation on the Council. (2) 
3. The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may 
require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the League, 
or at such other place as may be decided upon. (3) 
4. The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter 
within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the 
peace of the world. (4) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Wording made by Council of Three before May 5, 1919. 
Miller had planned for only great powers on this Council. 
This form is Wilson's idea in Fourth Draft. 
Suggested in "British Proposals to Drafting Committee" 
and proposed as an amendment by Cecil at eleventh meeting. 
Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 3, Paragraph 3, but no time 
limit set. 
Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 3, Paragraph 3. 
' I' 
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5. Any Member of the League not represented on the Council 
shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a Member 
at any meeting of the council during the consideration of 
matters especially affecting the interests of that Member 
of the League. (1) 
6. At meetings of the Council, each Member of the League 
represented on the Council shall have one vote, and may not 
have more than one Representative. (2) 
Article 5 
1. Except where otherwise expressly provided in this 
Covenant or by the terms of the present Treaty, decisions at 
any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require 
the agreement of all the Members of the League represented 
at the meeting. (3) 
2. AU~matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or 
of the Council, including the appointment of Committees to 
investigate particular matters, shall be registered by the 
Assembly (4) or by the Council and may be decided by a 
majority of the Members of the League represented at the 
meeting. 
1. Amendment suggested by Cecil at eleventh meeting. In-
cluded in Hurst-Miller Draft in less direct form. 
2. This article was drafted at a meeting of House, Cecil, 
Smuts, Orlando, Koo, Hurst and Miller. It has been 
retained as written. 
3. Suggested in eleventh meeting by Lord Cecil and adopted 
as read. 
4. Wilson's Second Draft, Article II, and his Fourth, Article 
II, paragraph 1. Wording there is different, majority 
idea omitted. Also in Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 2, 
arara h 4. 
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3. The First meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting 
of the Council shall be summoned by the President of the 
United States of America. (1) 
Article 6. 
1. The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the 
Seat of the League. The Secretariat shall comprise a 
Secretary General and such secretaries and staff as may 
be required. ( 2) 
2. The first Secretary General shall be the person named 
in the Annex; thereafter the _Secretary General shall be 
appointed by the Council with the approval of the majority 
of the Assembly. (3) 
3. The secretaries and staff of the Secretariat shall be 
appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the 
Council. ( 4) 
4. The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at 
all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council. (5) 
5. The expense of the Secretariat shall be borne by the 
Members of the League in accordance with the apportionment 
1. An English suggestion of third meeting. 
2. From Cecil Pla~ of January 14, 1919. Also in Hurst-
Miller Draft, Article 4, paragraphl. 
3. From Cecil Plan, although suggested only in part, "Appoint 
ment to be by great powers". Found more nearly like this 
article in amalgamation of Wilson's and Cecil's Drafts. 
4. Cecil-Miller Draft. In Hurst-Miller Draft omitting 
"with the approval of the Council." 
5. British Draft, January 20, 1919. Also in Hurst-Miller 
Draft, Article 4, paragraph 2. 
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of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Postal 
Union. (1) 
Article 7. 
1. The Seat of the League is established at Geneva. (2) 
2. The Council may at any time decide that the Seat of the 
League be elsewhere. (3) 
3. All positions under or in connection with the League, 
including the Secretariat, shall be open to men and women. (4) 
4. Representatives of the Members of the League and officials 
of the League when engaged on the business of the League 
shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.· (5) 
5. The buildings and other property occupied by the League 
or its officials or by Representatives attending its meetings 
shall be inviolable. (6) 
Article 8. 
1. The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance 
of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the 
lowest point consistent with national safety, (7) and the 
1. House Draft, Article 9. Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 4. 
2. Finally established at fourteenth meeting. 
3. Suggested to Drafting Committee by Miller. 
4. Proposed by British at thirteenth meeting. According to 
their law women are excluded if not named. 
5. In Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 5. 
6. Both paragraphs 4 and 5 were suggested by the British 
and are given in the Hurst-Miller Draft. The word 
"invincible" was a French amendment. 
7. House Draft, Article 21. Miller says this was given in a 
speech by Wilson, March 5, 1917 (Second Inaugural Address) 
"National armaments should be limited to the necessities 
of national order and domestic safety11 • It is also in 
Wilson's First Draft, Article IV, paragraph 1. 
I 
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enforcement by common action of international obligations.(l) 
2. The Council, taking account of the geographical situa-
tion and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans 
for such reduction for the consideration and action of the 
several governments. (2) 
3. Such plans8shall be subject to reconsideration and 
every 
revision at leastAten years. (3) 
4. After these plans shall have been adopted by the several 
Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not 
be exceeded without concurrence of the Council. (4) 
5. The Members of the League agree that the manufacture by 
private enterprize of mUJni tions and implements of war is 
open to grave objections. The Council shall advise how the 
evil effect attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, 
due regard being had to the necessities of. those Members of 
the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions 
and implements of war necessary for their safety. (5) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Wilson's First and Fourth Draft, Article rf, paragraph 1. 
Wilson's First Draft, Article IV, paragraph 1. 
One of the suggestions offered by the United States 
I 
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5. 
Senate. Cecil proposed this amendment. i 
Proposed by Cecil at eleventh meeting. 1 
Amendment proposed by Wilson. Cecil is also given credit i 
for it. The words, however, are Wilson's - Fourth Draft, ,~,:. 
Articre XI, paragraph 2. Cecil's amendment absolutely 
forbade private manufacture. li 
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6. The Members of the League undertake to interchange full 
and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, 
their military, naval and air programmes (1) and the condi-
tion of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like 
purposes. ( 2) 
Article 9. 
A permanent Commission shall be constituted to advise 
the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 
1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally.(3) 
Article 10. 
1. The Members of the League undertake to respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial 
integrity and existing (4) political independence of all 
Members of the League. (5) In case of any such aggression 
or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the 
Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation 
shall be fulfilled. (6) 
Article 11. 
1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting 
1. Wilson's First Draft, Article IV, paragraph 2. 
2. This phrase was added in Cecil's amendment at the 
eleventh meeting. 
3. Found in Specific Commissions in Italian Draft. Also in 
Specific Commissions in French Report. Part of article 
changed in ninth meeting. "On execution of Article I" 
omitted at that time. Proposed by Cecil and voted upon 
at tenth meeting. 
4. Word "existing" added in Hurst-Miller Draft. 
5. House Draft, Article 20. Also in Wilson's Fourth Draft, 
Article III. 
6. Amendment proposed by 1Nilson at fourth meeting. 
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any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared 
a matter of concern to the whole League, (1) and the League 
shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual 
to safeguard the peace of nations. (2) In case any such 
emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the 
request of any Member of the League forthwith summon a 
meeting of the Council. (ffi) 
2. It is also declared to be the friendly right of each 
Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly 
or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting inter-
national relations which threatens to disturb international 
peace or the good understanding between nations upon which 
peace depends. (4) 
Article 12. 
1. The Members of the League agree that if there should 
arise between them any dispute likely to lead to rupture, 
they agree in no case to resort to war until three months 
after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the 
Council. (5) 
1. House Draft, Article 5. 
paragraph 1. 
Wilson's Fourth Draft, ArticleVII'i 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Found in Wilson's First Draft, Article VIII, paragrapp 1. 
Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 9, paragraph 1. 
Found in Wilson's First Draft, Article VIII, paragraph 2. 
Wording there slightly different. 
Found in Phillimore Report Article 16, in different word-
ing but containing the same idea. Also in Wilson's 
Fourth Draft, Article VIII and in the Hurst-Miller Draft, 
Article 9, paragraph 2. 
Found in Phillimore Report, Article 1, in slightly differ-
' 
' 
li 
ent wording. In Wilson's Fourth Draft, Article V, 
paragraph 1, minus time clause. 
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2. In any case under this article the reward of the arbi-
trators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the re-
port of the Council shall be made within six months after 
the submission of the dispute. (1) 
Article 13. 
1. The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute 
shall arise between them which they recognize to be suitable 
for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfac-e 
torily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole 
subject-m~tter to arbitration.· {2) 
2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any 
question of international law, as to the existence of any 
fact which if established would constitute a breach of an 
international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of 
the reparation to be made for any such breach, are dec~ared 
to be among those which are suitable for submission to 
arbitration. (3) 
3. For the consideration of any such dispute the court of 
ar~itration to which the case is referred shall be the court 
of arbitration agreed on by the parties to the dispute or 
I! 
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1. Discussed at fourth meeting but no definite conclusion I 
reached. 
2. Phillimore Report, Article 1. 
3. Phillimore Report, Article 3, wording almost the same. I! 
Wilson's Fourth Draft, Article V, p~ragraph 2. 
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stipulated in any convention existing between them. (1) 
4. The Members of the League agree that they will carry 
out in full good faith any award that may be rendered, and 
that they will not resort to war against a Member of the 
League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure 
to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what 
steps should be taken to give effect thereto. (2) 
Article 14. 
The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members 
of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a 
Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall 
be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an inter-
national character which the parties thereto submit to it. 
The court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute 
or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly. 
(3) 
Article 15. 
1. If there should arise between Members of the League any 
dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted 
to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the Members 
of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the 
Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission 
1. Amendment proposed by Cecil at fourth meeting. 
2. Ideas are in Phillimore Report, Article 1, in Smuts Plan, 
in Cecil Plan of January 4, and in Wilson's Third Draft, 
Article V, Wording was agreed upon in ninth meeting of 
the commission 
3. Idea for this in House Draft, Article 10. 
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by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the 
Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements 
'' for a full investigation and consideration thereof. ( 1) 
2. For this purpose the parties to the dispute will commun-
icate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, (2) 
statements of their case with all the relevant facts and 
papers, (3) and the Council may forthwith direct the publica-
tion thereof. (4) 
3. The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the 
dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a statement 
shall be made public giving such facts and explanations 
regarding the dispute and the terms of the settlement thereof 
as the Council may deem appropriate. (5) 
4. If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either 
unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish 
a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute 
and the recommendations which are just and proper in regard 
thereto. ( 6) 
5. Any Member of the League represented on the Council may 
make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its 
conclusions regarding the same. (7) 
1. Wilson Draft, Article V, paragraph 1. 
2. "As promptly as possible"- an amendment by Vesnitch. 
3. As far as this in Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 13, 
paragraph 2. 
4. Amendment by Cecil. 
5. Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 13, paragraph 2. 
6. Phillimore Report, Article 11. Wilson's Third Draft, 
Article V, paragraph 6. Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 13. 
· re Rep..or._t_, Article lJ (Alh.ernative Art-I cl 
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6. If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by 
the Members thereof other than the Representatives of one or 
•· more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League 
agree that they will not go to war with any party to the 
dispute which complies with the recommendations of the 
report. ( 1) 
7. If the Council fails to reach a report which is unani-
mously agreed to by the Members thereof, other than the 
Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, 
the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right 
to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the 
maintenance of right and justice. 
8. If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of 
them and is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter 
which by international law is solely within the domestic 
jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and 
shall make no recommendation as to its settlement. (2) 
9. The Council may in any case under this Article refer the 
dispute to the Assembly. The dispute shall be so referred 
at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that 
such request be made within fourteen days after the sub-
mission of the dispute to the Council. (3} 
1. Phillimore Report, Article 1. Wilson suggested changes 
in this during twelfth meeting. Hurst-Miller Draft, 
Article 13, paragraph 2. 
2. Amendment written by Wilson during twelfth meeting. 
3. Report of a sub-committee at seventh meeting. 
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10. In any case referred to the Assembly, all the provisions , 
j of this Article and of Article 12 relating to ·the action 
and powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by 
the Assembly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those 
Members of the League represented on the Council and of a 
majority of the other Members of the League, exclusive in 
each case of the Representatives of the parties to the dis-
pute, shall have the same force as a report by the Council 
concurred in by all members thereof other than the Represen-
tatives of one or more parties to the dispute. 
Article 16. 
1. Should any Member of the League resort to war in dis-
, 
regard of its covenants under Article 12, 13 or 15, it shall 
ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against 
all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake 
immediately to subject it (1) to the severance of all trade 
or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse 
between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-
" i ! 
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breaking state, and the prevention of all financial,. commer-
cial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the 
covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, ~~ 
whether a Member of the League or not. (2) 
2. 
1. 
2. 
It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to 
11 which hereby undertake immediately to subject it", 
Wilson amendment at fifth meeting. 
Miller says tfis, il substance, is i± Philltmore Report ~rtkcle 0~ I so~t t 1has4been ~reat Y m~di iedthere.fAiso 1n ou~e ~.urar , l\.1· c e .L ana :tn 1vi son s our :n: vra t, 
Art .ru.~ 
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recommend to the several governments concerned what effective 
military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall 
severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to 
protect the covenants of the League. {1) 
3. The Members of the League agree, further, that they will 
mutually support one another in the financial and economic 
measures which are taken under this article, in order to 
minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above 
measures, and that they will mutually support one another 
in resisting any special measure aimed at one of their 
number by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will 
take the necessary steps to afford passage through their 
territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League 
which are cooper·ating to protect the Covenants of the 
League. ( 2) 
4. Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant 
of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the 
League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Repre-
sentatives of all other Members of the League represented 
thereon. (3) 
Article 17. 
l. In the event of a dispute between a Member of the League 
and a State which is not a Member of the League, or between 
1. Wilson's Third and B,ourth Drafts, 
2. Wilson's Third Draft, Article VI, 
paragraph 6. Hurst-Miller Draft, 
3. Inserted by drafting committee. 
Article 6. 
and Fourth, Article VI, J 
Article 14, paragraph 3. 
===-=-= -----=------,:. -·---- ------_ t=== 
States not Members of the League, the State or States not 
Members of the League shall be invited to accept the obliga-
~ tions of membership in the League for purposes of such dis-
pute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If 
such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 
to 16 inclusive (1) shall be applied with such modifications 
as may be deemed necessary by the Council. (2) 
-·---··-
2. Upon such invitation being given the Council shall imme-
diately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the 
dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most 
effectual in the circumstances. (3) 
3. If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obliga-
tions of membership in the League for the purposes of such 
dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the 
League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as 
against the state taking such action. (4) 
4. If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse to 
accept the obligations of membership in the League for the 
purposes of such dispute, the Council may take such measures 
and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities 
1. "Provisions •••• inclusive 11 , Cecil amendment at third 
meeting. 
2. Idea and part of wording in Phillimore Report, Articles 
13 and 14. Wording is as it was in Text agreed upon by 
Wilson and Cecil, March 18. 
3. Wilson's Fourth Draft, Article IX. Hurst-Miller Draft, 
Article 15, paragraph 2. 
4. 'vVilson' s Fourth Draft, Article IX. Hurst-Miller Draft, 
Article 15, paragraph 3. 
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and will result in the settlement of the dispute. (1) 
Article 18. 
Every treaty or international engagement entered into 
hereafter by any Member of the League (2) shall be forthwith 
registered with the Secretariat and shall be as soon as 
possible published by it. No. such treaty or international 
engagement shall be binding unless so registered. (3) 
Article 19. 
The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsid-
eration by Members of the League of treaties which have 
become inapplicable and the consideration of the inter-
national conditions whose continuance might endanger the 
world. 
Article 20. 
1. The Members of the League severally agree that this 
Covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or under-
takings inter ~ which are inconsistent with the terms 
thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter 
enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms 
thereof. 
2. In case any Member of the League shall, before becoming 
a Member of the League, have undertaken any obligations 
inconsistent with the terms of this Covenant, it shall be 
1. Wilson's Fourth Draft, Article IX. Hurst-Miller Draft, 
Article 15, paragraph 4. 
2. Idea suggested by Lansing. Wilson's Second Draft. 
3. Vestnitch. 
·--·-_---_··-.: -· ==== -·---·----------·-·-------- ·--- --~----- ----- ----- -- -----~- ---- - - -- -----.::.=--=-- :-=--==-:..--===::::::=---=.. 
101. 
----CC-if== 
the duty of such Member to take immediate steps to procure 
its release from such obligations. (1) 
Article 21. 
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the 
validity of international engagements, such as treaties of 
arbitration or reginal understandings like the Monroe 
Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace. (2) 
Article 22. (3) 
1. To those colonies and territories which as a consequence 
of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of 
the states which formerly governed them and which are inhab-
ited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under 
the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should 
be applied the principle that the well-being and development 
of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that 
securities for the performance of this trust should be em-
bodied in this covenant. 
2. The best method of giving practical effect to this 
principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be 
entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their re-
sources; their experience or their geographical position can 
best undertake this responsibility, and who are \rllling to 
1. Phillimore Report, Article 20, A. and B. Also in Wilson's 
Fourth Draft, Article XIII. 
2. Proposed by Wilson at fourteenth meeting. 
3. Idea of this article came from a proposal written by 
Smuts to Council of Ten on January 30. The wording is 
Wilson's. 
accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by 
them as Mandatories on be~alf of the League. (1) 
102. 
3. The character of the mandate must differ according to 
the stage of the development of the people, the geographical 
situation of the territory, and its economic conditions and 
other similar circumstances. (2) 
4. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish 
Empire have reached a stage of development where their 
existence as independent nations can be provisionally recog-
nized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and 
assistance by a mandatory until such a time as they are able 
to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a 
principle consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.(3) 
5. Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are 
at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for 
the administration of the territory under conditions which 
will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject 
only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the 
prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms 
traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifi-
cations or military and naval bases and of military training 
of the natives for other than police purposes and the 
defense of the territory and will also secure equal 
1. Wilson's Fourth Draft, Supplementary Agreement, I, 
paragraph 2. 
2. Wilson's F9urth Draft, Supplementary Agreement I, paragraph 3. 
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opportunities for the trade and commerce of the other 
members of the League. (1) 
6. There are territories, such as South-West Africa and 
certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the 
sparseness of their population, or their small size, or 
103. 
their remoteness from centres of civilization or their geo-
graphical contiguity to the territory of the.Mandatory, and 
other circumstances, can be best administered under the 
laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, 
subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests 
of the indigenous population. (2) 
7. In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to 
the Council an annual report in reference to the territory 
committed to its charge. (3) 
8. The degree of authority, central or administration to be 
exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed 
upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in 
each case by the Council. (4) 
9. A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive 
and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to 
advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance 
1. Wilson 1 s Fourth Draft, Supplementary Agreement II, 
paragraph 2. 
2. Same, paragraph 3. 
3. Wilson's Fourth Draft, Supplementary Agreement, III, 
paragraph 1. 
4. Wilson's Fourth 
• 
Draft, Supplementary Agreement, III, 
paragraph 2. 
·-------··' 
--~-------
------
104. 
===#==-======-=-==========================-=-----
of the mandates. (1) 
Article 23. 
Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of inter-
national conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, 
the Members of the League; 
(a) will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and 
humane conditions of labour for men, women, and 
children, (2) both in their own countries and in 
all countries to which their commercial and indus-
trial relations extend, and for that purpose will 
establish and maintain the necessary international 
organizations; (3) 
(b) undertake to secure just breatment of the native 
inhabitants of the territories under their control; 
(c) will entrust the League with the general super-
vision over the execution of agreements with regard 
to the traffic in women and children, and the 
traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs; 
(d) will entrust the League with the general super-
vision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the 
countries in which the control of this traffic is 
1. Wilson's Fourth Draft, Supplementary Agreement, III, 
paragraph 3. 
2. "men, women, and children", Wilson's suggestion in sixth 
meeting. 
3. Idea of this in Wilson's Fourth Draft, Supplementary 
Agreement, X. 
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necessary in the common interest; (1) 
(e) will make provision to.secure and maintain freedom 
of communications and of transit and equitable 
treatment for the commerce of all Members of the 
(f) 
There 
League. (~) In this connection the special necess-
ities of the regions devastated during the war of 
1914-1918 shall be borne in mind; (3) 
will endeavor to take steps in matters of inter-
national concern for the prevention and control of 
disease. (4) 
Article 24. 
shall be placed under the direction of the League 
all international bureaus already established by general 
treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such 
international bureaus and all commissions for the regulation 
of matters of international interest hereafter constituted 
shall be placed under the direction of the League. (5) 
2. In all matters of international interest which are regu-
lated by general conventions but which are not placed under 
the control of international bureaus or commissions, the 
Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of 
1. ~ Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 16. 
2. Hurst-Miller Draft, Article 20. 
3. This sentence proposed by Wilson in seventh meeting. 
The British amendment which made this an article of five 
paragraphs was adopted at the thirteenth·meeting. 
4. Proposed to the drafting committee by House. 
5. Idea in this paragraph found in Smuts' 11 Practical 
Suggestions. 11 
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the Council and if desired by the parties, collect and dis-
tribute all relevant information and shall render any other 
assistance which may be necessary or desirable. {1) 
3. The Council may include as a part of the expenses of the 
Secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which 
is placed under the direction of the League. {2) 
Article 25. 
The Membens of the League agree to encourage and promote 
the establishment and cooperation of duly authorized volun-
tary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the 
improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the 
mitig~ting of suffering throughout the world. {3) 
Article 26. 
1. Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when rati-
fled by the Members of the League whose Representatives com-
pose the Council and by a majority of the Members of the 
League whose Representatives compose the Assembly. (4) 
2. No such runendment shall bind any Members of the League 
which signifies its dissent therefrom, but in that case it 
shall cease to be a Member of the League. {5) 
1. Proposed by the British at the thirteenth meeting. 
2. Also proposed by British at thirteenth meeting. 
3. Wording by Miller, presented at fifteenth meeting. 
4. This amendment was supported mainly by the British and 
was worded carefully by Miller to fit the constitutions 
of the United States and other countries. Cecil asked 
that 11 majority11 be used instead of "three-fourths" at the 
thirteenth meeting. 
5. This amendment was added at fifteenth meeting to satisfy 
Brazil and Portugal. 
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SUMMARY 
One of the popular fallacies of post-war history has 
been that of giving the credit for the creation of the League 
of Nations to Woodrow Wilson. Although he wrote five drafts 
for the covenant he acted more as an editor than as an author 
of the famous document. Many writers, however, agree that if 
it had not been for his untiring work that the League would 
not have become a part of the Treaty of Versailles. It is 
the purpose of this thesis to show of what his contributions 
consisted. 
Wilson's early interests were in the field of con-
gressional government. When he became president his reforms 
were considered radical. This was especially true of his 
foreign policy. Even though the idea of a League of Nations 
1 was a natural out-growth of these policies his interest in 
the problem did not develop until after the beginning of the 
war. 
I I As early as 1910 societies were organized in the United 
i States to promote some means of insuring permanent peace in 
I \ the world. These early societies studied to provide some 
i peaceful means of settling international disputes. Those that 1; 
i I were formed after the war had begun concentrated their efforts :' 
i i on the problem of making peace after the war and of setting 
J i up some effective agency to maintain peace. Among the promin- 'I 
! 
/ ent persons in this country who were working in these organ-
! 
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izations were Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. 
During the early years of the World War Colonel E. M. House, 
acting as President Wilson's confidential advisor, made a 
number of trips to Europe to try to find some way of bringing 
about peace between the beligerents. 
It was not until the beginning of the war in Europe 
d that President Wilson gave any indication of his interest in 
I 
an organization for peace. He publicly committed himself to 
the idea of a League of Nations in May 1916 and after that 
time he referred to the idea in all of his important speeches. 
In March.l918 the English Government appointed a com-
mittee to draft a constitution for a League of Nations. This 
plan, known as the Phillimore Report, was sent to the heads 
of governments in Europe and America. 
Mr. Wilson considered this plan insufficient andasked 
Colonel House to draft a "Covenant" embodying their ideas. 
After receiving the draft from Colonel House Mr. Wilson wrote 
his First Draft. He incorporated many of the ideas of the 
Phillimore Report and the House Draft. He provided for a 
permanent secretariat, qualified quarantees of territorial 
independence, disarmament, obligatory arbitration of disputes 
and the use of force against a state that went to war. His 
Second Draft, written in Paris after he had studied Smuts• 
Practical Suggestion, was different in that he dropped com-
pulsory arbitration, adopted the idea of an Executive 
:I 
i 
;I 
" 
.: 
i 
I 
! 
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Council, the plan for mandates, the sanction of an ipso facto 
war and added provisions for the welfare of labor and for 
religious freedom. General Bliss, Mr. Lansing and Mr. Miller 
offered suggestions which resulted in minor changes in the 
Third Draft. Wilson realized that he still had not satisfied 
everyone so he wrote a Fourth Draft. This one included as 
new material the mandates resolution adopted by the Council 
of Ten. 
Although the President's Fourth Draft was not used as 
the basis for discussions in the Commission meetings many of 
his articles were written into the Hurst-Miller Draft which 
was used. President Wilson acted as chairman of this com-
mission of nineteen members. The commission held fifteen 
meetings. In the first ten the Draft of the Covenant was 
read through three times, article by article. Discussion 
followed the reading, amendments were submitted, suggestions 
were made. As a rule discussion centered upon the wording 
of the articles or matters equally routine. Really important 
I differences were worked out in small meetings between the 
II 
II 
commission meetings. Questions which aroused debate were 
those relating to the representation of the smaller powers on 
the Council of the League, the maintenance of a military 
force under the control of the League, and the racial equality 
'.I !i amendment submitted by the Japanese. 
il 
After the tenth meeting l 
' 
1
1 of the commission the Covenant was presented to the Peace ,, 
i 
II 
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Conference. At the same time it was given to the rest of the 
world. There were many criticisms, those of greatest im-
portance came from the United States Senate. Upon the 
President's return to Paris he complied with their demands 
and asked the commission to include an article recognizing 
the Monroe Doctrine and an amendment providing for withdrawal 
11 from the League. II 
These were included after prolonged dis-
cussions. The Covenant in its final form was then presented 
to the Peace Conference to be included in the Versailles 
Treaty as Part One. 
Woodrow Wilson wrote very little of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations. He edited the ideas of others trying to 
bring together the best opinions of everyone. Much of the 
phrasing of the document is his. He was a carefUl writer and 
delighted in the correct use of words. As chairman of the 
commission he was firm andfair in hie decisions. · He refused 
to be diverted from the main issues. He believ~d in the 
League and was determined that it should be an integral part 
of the peace treaty. He used the force of his personality 
and his high position as President of the United States to 
accomplish that end. 
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